Labour Conspiracy Cases in the United States, 1805-1842: Bias and Legitimation in Common Law Adjudication by Holt, Wythe
Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 22, Number 4 (Winter 1984) Article 1
Labour Conspiracy Cases in the United States,
1805-1842: Bias and Legitimation in Common
Law Adjudication
Wythe Holt
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Article
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Hall
Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Holt, Wythe. "Labour Conspiracy Cases in the United States, 1805-1842: Bias and Legitimation in Common Law Adjudication."
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 22.4 (1984) : 591-663.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol22/iss4/1
Labour Conspiracy Cases in the United States, 1805-1842: Bias and
Legitimation in Common Law Adjudication
Abstract
During the first half of the nineteenth-century American workers who went on strike were often charged with
or indicted for criminal conspiracy. Wythe Holt attributes their convictions to the bias of the judges, who
openly sided with the employers. This example of class identification and class conflict should be taken note of
by non-Marxists.
This article is available in Osgoode Hall Law Journal: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol22/iss4/1
LABOUR CONSPIRACY CASES IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1805-1842: BIAS AND
LEGITIMATION IN COMMON LAW
ADJUDICATION
BY WYTHE HOLT*
During the first half of the nineteenth-century American workers who went on
strike were often charged with or indicted for criminal conspiracy. Wythe Holt
attributes their convictions to the bias of the judges, who openly sided with the
employers. This example of class identification and class conflict should be
taken note of by non-Marxists.
I. INTRODUCTION .............................. 592
II. THE WORKERS' ARGUMENTS ................ 597
A. Legal Arguments ........................... 598
1. Legal Technicalities ..................... 600
2. Constitutional Claims .................... 600
3. Definition of "Conspiracy" ................ 601
4. Applicability of Conspiracy ............... 602
B. Economic Arguments ........................ 605
1. The Historical Condition of the Workers ... 605
2. Ideological Divisions Among the Workers... 612
3. Themes in the Workers' Arguments ........ 613
III. THE BIAS OF THE JUDGES ................... 619
A . Overview .................................. 619
B. The Philadelphia Cordwainers Case ........... 621
C. The Pennsylvania Cases, 1815-1836 ........... 625
D. The New York Cases, 1809-1836 ............. 631
E. Commonwealth v. Hunt at the Trial Level ..... 636
IV. CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW, THE WORKERS AND
THE RULE OF LAW .......................... 638
© Copyright, 1984, Wythe Holt.
* Professor of Law, University of Alabama. This essay was given in a previous form, as a
paper at the Fifth Annual North American Labor History Conference in Detroit on Oct. 13,
1983. Research was funded in part by a grant from Dean Charles W. Gamble and the University
of Alabama School of Law. The author wishes to express his thanks to Fred Konefsky and James
Atleson, who have generously contributed bibliographic and moral support to this project; to his
colleague Tony Freyer, who made several helpful suggestions; and to Robert Glennon and espe-
cially Harry Glasbeek and Sandra vanBurkleo, all of whom gave crucial substantive and moral
aid.
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
A. The Puzzle of Hunt ......................... 639
B. Shaw's True Colours in Hunt ................ 643
V. CONCLUSION ................................ 653
A. Going Too Far ............................. 653
B. The Strengths of Class Analysis .............. 655
APPENDIX AND TABLES ..................... 659
I. INTRODUCTION
[J]udges found . . . criminal conspiracy entirely too convenient an instrument
for enforcing their own individual notions of justice to be lightly discarded. It
enabled judges to punish by criminal process such concerted conduct as seemed
to them socially oppressive or undesirable, even though the actual deeds commit-
ted constituted of themselves no crime, either by statute or by common law.,
On November 1, 1805, the journeymen shoemakers of Philadel-
phia went on strike for higher wages.2 Strikes were relatively novel in
the United States, but work stoppages had begun to occur during the
twenty-odd years since independence with a frequency which was
frightening to employers and their social allies.3 What is more, the
strikes were usually successful.4 In mid-November, at the instance of
' Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy (1922), 35 Harv. L. Rev. 393 at 406.
2 The record of this case [hereinafter the Philadelphia Cordwainers case] has been preserved
in Commons & Gilmore, eds., 3 Documentary History of American Industrial Society (1910) at
59-248 [hereinafter Documentary History]. "Cordwainers" is an old name for certain
shoemakers.
Volumes 3 and 4 of the Documentary History contain the records or citations of most of the
cases discussed herein (see infra Appendix). Commons and his associates did not, however, track
down all of the labour conspiracy cases which occurred during the period 1805-1842. See, e.g.,
Wallace, Rockdale: The Growth of an American Village in the Early Industrial Revolution
(1978) at 364-65, 373-74.
3 See Olton, Artisans for Independence. Philadelphia Mechanics and the American Revolu-
tion (1975) at 13-18; Nash, The Urban Crucible: Social Change, Political Consciousness, and the
Origins of the American Revolution (1979) at 323-25; Morris, Government and Labor In Early
America (1946) at 193-207; Morris, Criminal Conspiracy and Early Labor Combinations In New
York (1937), 52 Pol. Sci. Q. 51; Saposs, "Colonial and Federal Beginnings (to 1827)," in Com-
mons et al, eds., I History of Labor in the United States (1918) 25, at 108-11, 125-27; Foner, I
History of the Labor Movement in the United States (1947) at 70-72.
' In Philadelphia, for example, the testimony and other evidence presented in Philadelphia
Cordwainers at 93-94, 72 indicates that the journeymen shoemakers had been organized since at
least 1794 and had been successful in at least three, but probably five strikes between 1794 and
1798 (the date of 1798 given in Logan's testimony in the case appears to be in error from internal
evidence and probably should read "1794"). In 1799, the employers confederated and tried to lock
out the shoemakers, but the latter prevailed again in "a most obstinate turn-out [strike] on both
sides . . . [which] went on for a considerable time" (id. at 113)(testimony of union president
James Geoghan), as the employers were unsuccessful in forcing wages down (id. at 77, 113-15,
125). A short strike in 1804 continued the string of union victories (id. at 123-87), but the em-
ployers were able unilaterally to lower wages during the winter of 1804-1805 (id. at 121, 123-24),
thus precipitating the November 1805 walkout. For a similar pattern of employee victories before
an 1814 strike which led to the first labour conspiracy arrest in Pittsburgh, see Pittsburgh Cord-
wainers at 30-34, 65-66, 68.
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the employers and much to the chagrin and surprise of the workers,
eight members of the shoemakers' union were arrested and charged
with the common law crime of conspiracy.5 The strikers capitulated
within days of the arrests and, after a heated trial the succeeding
March, the shoemakers were convicted.
There had been sporadic labour conspiracy arrests in the colonies
and states before November 1805,6 and conspiracy charges were rou-
tinely brought against labour organizations in contemporary England
pursuant to a series of statutes regulating labour and prices.7 The con-
cept of the transformation of co-operative economic pressure by work-
ers into a common law crime was thus in the air.8 Nevertheless, the
indictment and conviction of working people for conspiracy seemed ar-
bitrary, unfair and class-oriented when all they had done was to at-
tempt to exert the same kind of collective pressure against employers
that employers' organization, with their massive control of capital and
6 [Philadelphia] Aurora [and] General Advertiser, Nov. 27 & 28, 1805. The fees of the
prosecuting attorneys were paid by the complaining employers, not by the government (see Phila-
delphia Cordwainers at 98).
6 Morris, "Preface" in 3-4 Documentary History of American Industrial Society (1958) at
II, Uli.
7 Id. at v-vii. See, generally, Sayre, supra note 1.
8 However, Philadelphia Cordwainers is probably the first reported case in the Anglo-Ameri-
can legal community of a conviction of organized workers for conspiracy at common law [see, e.g.,
Manchester, A Modern Legal History of England and Wales 1750-1950 (1980) at 329 (there is
no reported English conviction before 1825)]. Although the workers in Philadelphia Cordwainers
and the other early American cases argued strenuously that workers' economic organizations and
activity did not constitute a crime at the common law (see infra notes 52-55 and accompanying
text), the existence of both indictments and informations attempting to criminalize such activity
during the late 1700s and dicta in judges' opinions castigating concerted activity by worker orga-
nizations as illegal [R. v. Mawbey, [1796] 6 Term Rep. 619 at 636 per Grose J.; Holdsworth, 14
A History of English Law (1938) at 447-98] indicates that such a view of the law is too narrow.
The common law is what the judges and the prosecutors say it is, and they act upon what their
culture, education, experience and interests dictate to them to be in the interests of their
community.
A similarly narrow focus is found in a recent discussion of early labour conspiracy indict-
ments in Toronto. Paul Craven's study of the record in Toronto during the period 1854-1872
"demonstrates that prosecutions for conspiracy were launched much more frequently in circum-
stances of employer-worker conflict than was formerly thought," indicating that prosecutors firmly
believed labour concert to be conspiracy. However, Craven also "argues that the courts did not
view workers' combinations to raise wages as criminal conspiracies" at that time [Craven, Work-
ers' Conspiracies in Toronto, 1854-72: A Re-examination (unpub. 1983) at 1]. What, then, was
"the law"? Ought we to join in Manchester's conclusion, that "[c]learly the legal position was
confused," (id. at 330) or ought we to take a broader view of the nature of law? The workers in
Toronto during the twenty years studied by Craven, and the workers in the United States during
the period covered by my study, were not confused: they knew both that the law was against them
and that, as a result, the law had an illegitimate bias [see the statement made by labour leader
Frederick Robinson in 1834 at the text accompanying infra note 21; in addition, see Holt, Morton
Horwitz and the Transformation of American Legal History (1982), 23 Win. & Mary L. Rev.
663 at 707-715; Gabel, "Reification in Legal Reasoning," in Beirne & Quinney, eds., Marxism
and Law (1982) 262].
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the marketing process, exerted against workers. "[T]he prospect is a
very sad one . . .[indeed] the name of freedom is but a shadow," the
Philadelphia shoemakers proclaimed to the public, when "the associa-
tion of men to regulate the price of labour is to be converted into a
crime, and labeled with the same reproachful terms as a design against
the freedom of the nation."9 Through able and sympathetic counsel the
workers laid their protest before the court, arguing that enlarging com-
mon law conspiracy would import a foreign class-bias into American
law, thus promoting employers' interests while ignoring those of work-
ers. The judge brushed aside all such claims and adopted in whole the
employers' argument that union activity interfered with the good of the
community. It violated "the natural course of things," said Recorder
Levy. "It is impossible that any man can carry on commerce in this
way. 1
0
The success of the employers in obtaining the aid of the state in
breaking the strike, in convicting the workers, and thus in giving them-
selves control over wages was to lead to a wave of similar indictments
throughout the industrializing northeastern United States in the next
thirty-five years. While developments in Great Britain and Canada fol-
lowed somewhat different paths," until at least the 1880s charges of
criminal conspiracy would prove to be the most frequently used "nonvi-
olent" method of suppressing or curtailing labour organization in the
Anglo-American world. 2
The focus of this essay is upon the rhetoric used by the judges to
justify their actions in the earliest United States cases, from Philadel-
phia Cordwainers in 1806 to Commonwealth v. Hunt in 1842. Despite
their advancement by competent and usually eminent counsel, the
workers' arguments were disregarded in case after case by judges who
sounded very much like Recorder Levy. Contrary to the notions of pre-
cedent and internal logical consistency which are supposed to be intrin-
sic to modern judicial discourse, and contrary to the fundamental no-
tion of fairness at the heart of the concept of the rule of law, the judges
used biased rhetoric. They "openly sided against the journeymen" in
9 Philadelphia Aurora [and] General Advertiser, Nov. 28, 1805 (statement of James Ghegan
(sic, see supra note 4), president, and George Keamer, secretary of the union, the latter of whom
was one of the eight arrested and convicted).
10 Philadelphia Cordwainers at 228-29.
11 Compare Manchester, supra note 8, at 329-44 (English developments), with Craven, supra
note 8, and Arthurs et al., Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Canada (2d ed. 1982) at 36-
40 (Canadian developments).
12 For the United States, see Witte, Early American Labor Cases (1926), 35 Yale L. J. 825
at 828-36; Turner, The Early American Labor Conspiracy Cases: Their Place in Labor Law
(1967) at 68-71.
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favour of the employers.13 The Philadelphia Aurora was outraged by
the partisanship displayed against the shoemakers:
A man who did not know the purposes for which the law contemplated the ap-
pointment of a recorder to preside in the mayor's court, would questionably have
concluded that Mr. Recorder Levy had been paid by the master shoemakers for
his discourse . . . - never did we hear a charge to a jury delivered in a more
prejudiced and partial manner .... 14
Although at times the rhetoric would seem milder and more re-
strained, in each instance a pro-employer, pro-entrepreneurial bias was
built into the language of the law used by the judges. The economic
advantages which the employers possessed (and about which the work-
ers complained) were ratified by the acceptance of entrepreneurship,
profits and commercial growth as necessary, beneficent, unquestionable,
normal. The appearance of justice was restored to the law of labour
conspiracy by Chief Justice Shaw's sophisticated opinion on appeal in
Commonwealth v.Hunt.The workers won for the first time under a ju-
dicial opinion, but the opinion hid the same pro-entrepreneurial nor-
mality inside a much more complicated, seemingly fair set of legalistic
propositions. In this way, what is bias from the standpoint of one party
- the workers - becomes unrecognizable as bias from the standpoint
of legal culture, since the viewpoint of the other side - the employers
- has become normal, obvious, the epitome of "consensus".
Perhaps more curious than the partisanship of early nineteenth-
century American judges is the blindness demonstrated by twentieth-
century American legal scholars to that partisanship. Of the eight legal
historians who have studied these cases in depth in this century, only
one has, even hesitatingly, come to face the fact of open judicial bias.15
13 Saposs, supra note 3, at 151.
14 Philadelphia Aurora [and] General Advertiser, March 31, 1806 (emphasis in original).
William Duane, the outspoken Anglo-Irish expatriate who edited the Aurora, espoused the cause
of the workers so zealously that one of the first acts of the prosecuting counsel in Philadelphia
Cordwainers was to warn the jurors that the Aurora "teemed with false representations and state-
ments" about the conspiracy charges, uttering "the most insolent abuse of the parties. . . with a
view (if not with declared intention), to poison the public mind, to obstruct the pure streams of
justice flowing from the established courts of law" (Philadelphia Cordwainers at 67). The exis-
tence of judicial bias so frightened the counsel for the workers that, in closing, they felt impelled
to urge the jury to ignore the Aurora and "decide upon the facts and the law" (thus attempting to
establish a scapegoat) (ld. at 173).
1B Turner, supra note 12, at 56:
Without claiming any mathematical certainty where so much information is lacking, [Tur-
ner's rough] scale [of judicial hostility to workingmen's organizations] nevertheless does a
better job of explaining the differences between the outcomes of the various conspiracy
trials than alternative explanations advanced. These are hard words, for in them is the
latent suggestion that judicial prejudice rather than "law" in some other sense was the key
to understanding the early conspiracy cases. This extreme view does not imply motivation
on the part of the judges, but it does imply that the outcome of the early conspiracy cases,
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Most of these commentators have spent their efforts attempting to for-
tify and justify one or another legalistic position; that is, they have at-
tempted to show that the "law" really did matter, and really did make
some sort of neutral, non-partisan, non-economic and non-political
sense in the early labour conspiracy cases. For the most part, they have
accepted the rhetoric of the judges as being normal. By failing to get
beneath the surface, the commentators have joined the biased position
of the judges: by playing the internal word-games of the law, they elim-
inate the real-world truths of political, social and economic inter-rela-
tionship which comprise legal cases and problems."0 The confederation
of the judicial and academic ideologues may have been unwitting, but,
by promoting certain economic interests, by manufacturing or ratifying
the supposed worker conspiracies (under the cover of a presumed neu-
tral consensus), the confederation is literally a conspiracy under the
common law definition of that term. Since the effect of their actions
has been to promote the interests of a group defined by their relation to
the means of production, their supposedly neutral rhetoric is class bias.
The implications of this story for Canadian readers may seem
clear enough, since Canadian judges similarly espouse neutral consen-
sus and adherence to precedent, while using rhetoric which, perhaps
unwittingly, has been developed from the point of view of entrepre-
neurs, employers and their culture. As capitalism emerged into its en-
trepreneurial moments, the raw nature of the conflict between employ-
ers and workers created difficulties for all Anglo law and legal
functionaries similar to those first encountered in the United States
from 1800 to 1840. Moreover, the labour-conspiracy manoeuvre was
albeit usually jury trials of "peers," [sic] were largely dependent on the views of the judges
regarding law and society and not upon some inexorable or natural law or any other "pre-
vailing" principle .... In my opinion, then, an examination of the cases reveals judicial
hostility as being the most powerful explanatory factor yet advanced to explain the varia-
tions among the decisions of the early conspiracy cases. The "mistaken law" thesis is more
than anything a means of saving face by the legal profession which is ultimately responsi-
ble for having permitted judges to have substituted their own opinions for predictable law
[see also, Holt, Tilt (1984), 52 Gee. Wash. L. Rev. 280 at 282-83].
Other 20th-century treatments by legal historians are, listed chronologically, as follows:
Sayre, supra note 1 (who, as the quote shows, came close at times to stating the judicial bias
thesis); Witte, supra note 12; Nelles, The First American Labor Cases (1931), 41 Yale L. J. 165
and infra note 112; Landis, "Historical Introduction," in Cases on Labor Law (1936) 1-18, 28-36;
Teller, I Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining (1940) at 31-33, 47, 62-66; Levy, The Law of
the Commonwealth and Chief Justice Shaw (1957) at 183-206; Forkosch, The Doctrine of Crimi-
nal Conspiracy and Its Modern Application to Labor (1962), 40 Tex. L. Rev. 303 at 473. It must
be noted that I have been unable to obtain a copy of Quimby, The Cordwainers Protest: A Crisis
in American Labor Relations (1967), 3 Winterthur Portfolio 83, and so make no comment upon
it.
I$ Compare Kairys, ed., The Politics of Law (1982).
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used in Canada, at a somewhat later period and somewhat more hesi-
tantly, to accomplish approximately the same purposes with approxi-
mately the same results. 17 While the experience in Great Britain was
somewhat altered by the existence of a medieval framework of statu-
tory regulation of production, after the elimination of this framework
and the substitution of a generally-phrased and ambiguous statute in
1825 "there was a tendency to regard trade union strikes as criminal
. . . within the meaning of the 1825 Act or at common law." 18 Eco-
nomic activity by labour organizations was harassed and interdicted by
nineteenth-century English courts, under various theories including
conspiracy, similarly using class-biased rhetoric (a rhetoric spuriously
promoting "individualism" 19), and adding the element of severely limit-
ing or even misreading the sometimes clumsy attempts of Parliament to
give aid to the workers. 20 The lessons of the early American cases thus
apply both generally and specifically to the Canadian experience.
II. THE WORKERS' ARGUMENTS
The judiciary in this state, and in every State where judges hold their office
during life, is the headquarters of the aristocracy .... What then ought we to
think of the man who, being a member of the secret trades union of the bar, calls
upon the jury to indict the members of the open Trades Union of the people, who
join not for the purpose of injuring others, but for the enjoyment of their most
inestimable right [to fix the price of their own labour], to be deprived of which
must always keep them in want, ignorance, and slavery? ... Of all the reforms
which we have pledged ourselves to accomplish[,] the reform of the judiciary and
of the laws is the most important. 21
During the momentous thirty-five years from Philadelphia Cord-
wainers to Commonwealth v. Hunt, counsel for the workers often made
strong, even brilliant arguments on behalf of their clients. Just as con-
sistently (until Hunt), the courts ignored or curtly dismissed these ar-
guments. It is important to understand their substantive strength, both
to emphasize that the courts were acting one-sidedly in rejecting them
17 See authorities cited, supra note 11.
Is Portus, The Development of Australian Trade Union Law (1958) at 34.
19 Glasbeek, (unpublished book) at 42-47.
20 Orth, "The Law of Strikes, 1847-1871," in Guy & Beale, eds., Law and Social Change in
British History (1984) at 126-44.
21 Robinson, "An oration before the Trades' Union of Boston and Vicinity, July 4, 1834," in
Blau, ed., Social Theories of Jacksonian Democracy (1954) at 328, 329, 332. The "call upon thejury" mentioned by Robinson was apparently one delivered by Judge Peter Oxenbridge Thacher
in an unreported 1832 case. As we shall see, infra notes 209-19 and accompanying text, Thacher
was later to exhibit the same view of the economic rights of union members when he was the trial
judge (and reporter) in Commonwealth v. Hunt (1840), Thacher 609 [hereinafter Hunt; see Ap-
pendix for citation form used herein].
1984]
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and to obtain additional insight into the views the workers took of
themselves and their economic conditions. While we must greatly dis-
count for the fact that the positions taken by the workers in these argu-
ments have been filtered through the minds and mouths of lawyers -
with their lack of continuing first-hand acquaintance with workers' con-
ditions, an equally obvious baggage of professional ideology, and their
catering to the neutralizing, harmonizing conventions and decorums of
legalism and of law courts22 - the workers' self-awareness was never-
theless acute, sophisticated and clear.
For the sake of making a point to the modern reader, I have at-
tempted to split off the "purely" legal arguments made by workers'
counsel from their social, political and economic arguments (grouped
together below as "economic arguments"). Counsel in the cases did not
so understand the nature of their task, and what we would today term
legalistic argument was strewn with references to politics, economics
and social position, perhaps more noticeably in the earlier cases. In
many ways the separation of these two categories (as we now think of
them) cripples the force and thrust of the workers' position. They were
fighting against a loss of cohesion and wholeness in their world; more-
over, they understood the politics innate to law, seeing no need to
equivocate. Nevertheless, such a division emphasizes the clarity and
strength of the workers' vision. Further, it will be seen that this attempt
at separation ultimately does not "work", thus demonstrating the false-
ness of liberal particularism.
A. Legal Arguments
In ten of the conspiracy cases (six of which involved cordwainers
and all of which were from the "industrializing" states of Pennsylvania,
New York, Connecticut and Massachusetts), there is a sufficiently
thorough account to discern the specific arguments made by counsel.23
22 The sorts of economic and social arguments at the heart of the workers' cases were pre-
cisely the matters which the "harmony" demanded by court convention and decorum were
designed to neutralize or ignore, so counsel for the workers constantly walked a tightrope. At
times they breached the ground rules, as when a frustrated William Sampson accused the court of
bias in the New York Cordwainers case (see text accompanying infra notes 173-76).
23 The ten cases, in chronological order, were: Philadelphia Cordwainers (1806); New York
Cordwainers (1809); Pittsburgh Cordwainers (1815); New York Hatters (1832); Buffalo Tailors
(1824); Philadelphia Tailors (1827); Geneva [N.Y.] Shoemakers (1835); Hudson [N.Y.] Shoe-
makers (1836); Thompsonville [Conn.] Carpet Weavers (1836); and the Boston shoemakers,
Hunt.
I have chosen to work with the lower court report of worker counsel Robert Rantoul's argu-
ment in Hunt, since it is more elaborated than the appeals court report. It appears that Rantoul
changed nothing of his argument upon the appeal, with one exception (see Infra note 112 and
accompanying text). All there is of the Buffalo Tailors case is a newspaper report reproduced in
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In two cases, the workers' counsel went to extraordinary lengths to but-
tress their arguments with research into medieval and early modern
English statutory and case law,24 while in these and three others the
arguments made on behalf of the workers were extremely thorough,
ingenious and capable.25 All five of the lawyers who made these argu-
ments - Caesar Rodney, William Sampson, Walter Forward, John W.
Edmonds and Robert Rantoul - were prominent politicians or par-
tisans on the Democratic side of the American two-party system.26 It
was evident to all in the courtrooms that these "legal" problems were
political in nature.
Documentary History, and it does not give more than a terse summary of the arguments made by
counsel; therefore, it is possible other legal and economic arguments were made therein.
2'4 See New York Cordwainers at 257-95, 305-307, 309; Hunt at 623-34.
21 See Philadelphia Cordwainers at 162-206 [and at 107-113, 143-62 (remarks of workers
co-counsel Walter Franklin)]; New York Cordwainers at 256-310, 336-60, 372-74; Pittsburgh
Cordwainers at 56-71; Hudson Shoemakers at 288-309; Hunt at 622-34.
26 Rodney had just served a term as one of the most prominent Jeffersonian Democrats in the
federal House of Representatives (1803-1805); he was to be appointed United States Attorney
General later in 1806 by President Thomas Jefferson and then reappointed by President James
Madison; he was President James Monroe's inaugural ambassador to Argentina; and he was to be
re-elected to the House of Representatives in 1820 and elected to the United States Senate in
1822 [see Malone et al., eds., 15 Dictionary of American Biography (1935) at 82-83 (hereinafter
DAB)]. Rodney was from Delaware since it proved difficult to find a lawyer of prestige in the
overwhelmingly Federalist Philadelphia bar who would oppose the eminent Federalist lawyers (Ja-
red Ingersoll, the son of a loyalist, and Joseph Hopkinson) who appeared for the prosecuting
employers (see Nelles, supra note 15, at 168-73).
Sampson was a notorious supporter of Irish freedom. He had been reared in Ireland and
became a fugitive from British justice because of his acts in support of his homeland. He had for
that reason been denied the right to emigrate to the United States by President John Adams and
the pro-British Federalists who governed the United States from 1797-1801. Coming to New York
only in 1806, Sampson soon made a name for himself as an outspoken and erudite spokesman for
the radical elements in the Democratic Party [see 15 DAB 321; also Bloomfield, American Law-
yers in a Changing Society, 1776-1876 (1976) at 59-90].
Walter Forward, only 29 at the time of the Pittsburgh trial, was the fiery editor of the Demo-
cratic newspaper Tree of Liberty as well as a rising trial lawyer, he would serve two terms as a
Democratic Congressman in the 1820s before mellowing to become a founder of the Whig Party
in the mid-thirties (he would later be Whig Comptroller of the Currency, Secretary of the Trea-
sury and Ambassador to Denmark) [see 6 DAB (1931) at 357-358].
John W. Edmonds, 37 at the time of the Hudson trial, had studied law with the prominent
Democratic politician (and later President) Martin van Buren, was editor of the local Democratic
newspaper, and was serving in the New York legislature as well as practicing law, later becoming
a more prominent attorney in New York City. Democratic President Andrew Jackson appointed
him an Indian Commissioner later in the year of the Hudson trial, and he thereafter was well-
known as a reform inspector in the New York prison system, and as a trial and appellate judge
(see 6 DAB at 23-24).
Robert Rantoul, 35 at the time of the trial in Hunt, was a Democratic member of the Massa-
chusetts legislature and a prominent reformer; he later represented some of the Dorr rebels from
Rhode Island, was federal District Attorney for Massachusetts under Democratic President James
K. Polk, and had the unusual honour of being elected to both the United States Senate and to the
House of Representatives in 1851, shortly before his death (see 15 DAB at 381-82).
There were two lawyers for the workers in most of these cases, but one of the two was usually
the more prominent and usually handled the brunt of the argumentation.
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1. Legal Technicalities
In at least four of the cases it was argued (probably correctly on
my reading of the documents) that portions of the indictments failed
technically as being too vague and indefinite.2 7 "It is a rule of the com-
mon law of Pennsylvania," Rodney noted in the Philadelphia Cord-
wainers case, "that every indictment shall contain a certain and precise
allegation, ' 28 for otherwise defendants would not be informed of the
charges against them; supposedly a crucial technicality in a democratic
republic, and one which is the rule today. The state had alleged in the
indictment that the wages desired by the shoemakers were greater than
either what was usual or what was customary.
What are the usual rates and prices? [Rodney queried.] Ought they not to have
been stated before we were made to answer to a criminal accusation, for not
adhering to them?... If it be contended on the part of the prosecution, that the
rates and prices of such work, are so fixed and settled by usage and custom, that
they cannot be altered: that usage and custom ought to be clearly and explicitly
proven .... In civil cases, where a custom is relied upon, it must be proven or
attempted to be proVed. In fact, none exists .... Neither custom nor law, has
fixed the price of this or any other kind of work.29
Similarly, in three of the cases it was forcefully argued that the prose-
cution had failed to prove some of its key charges.30
2. Constitutional Claims
The kinds of constitutional argument heard in the United States
today were by and large not made in these cases, largely because exten-
sion of the protections against state action afforded to citizens by the
Bill of Rights had not yet occurred (via the passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment and its painfully slow judicial enlargement in the twenti-
eth-century). 31
However, some constitutional arguments were put forward. In the
Philadelphia Cordwainers case, the workers ingeniously claimed that
the Pennsylvania constitution's guarantee of the right to assemble
" Philadelphia Cordwainers at 143-44; New York Cordwainers at 301-303; Philadelphia
Tailors at 216; Hunt at 634.
" Philadelphia Cordwainers at 143-44.
29 Philadelphia Cordwainers at 144; and see New York Cordwainers at 304 (Sampson).
0 Philadelphia Cordwainers at 148; New York Cordwainers at 356; Philadelphia Tailors at
221. It was also argued in one case that the criminal law already provided a complete and ade-
quate remedy for any threats or violence which could be proved in the activities of the workers
(Philadelphia Cordwainers at 147-48).
SI Nevertheless, arguments were made that today would be recognized as involving equal
protection claims about the underinclusiveness of the crime as stated in the indictments (see, e.g.,
Philadelphia Cordwainers at 148-49, 153-54).
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peaceably protected their union meetings.32 In two cases, counsel made
separation-of-powers arguments, urging that the legislature and not the
judiciary (either through juries or by the judge) had the constitutional
power to regulate prices or wages.3 3 In six of the cases, mostly the later
ones, counsel argued that the workers had the right to decide at what
prices and for which employers they might choose to work, although in
none was this claim bottomed upon a specific constitutional provision.
3 4
3. Definition of "Conspiracy"
Very similar to this latter claim of right was the argument that the
crime of conspiracy had never been defined to include the combining by
several persons to accomplish only what each of them had the plain
right to accomplish individually. As Walter Forward put it in the Pitts-
burgh Cordwainers case:
None can deny the right of every man to affix his own price to his own labor; it is
a right with which no court nor jury nor even the legislature ever dared to inter-
fere; on what principle shall an act, lawful and innocent in one, become criminal
from the concurrence of another? The defendants might, as individuals, demand
what price they pleased for their work; is it a crime to agree that their prices
shall be uniform?
35
The novelty, absurdity and broad ranging consequences of such a
loose definition of conspiracy as the prosecution urged was argued in at
least five of the cases.36 That such a loosely defined crime as labour
conspiracy was no law at all, but was a discriminatory dragnet
designed to catch only certain sorts of economic actors at the instance
of others who were being economically hurt, was brought home clearly
by the redoubtable William Sampson, arguing on behalf of the New
York cordwainers:
The notion that confederating to do anything indirectly tending to impoverish a
32 Id. at 158.
33 Id. at 201; Pittsburgh Cordwainers at 76.
34 New York Cordwainers at 261, 278-79, 293, 299, 304; Pittsburgh Cordwainers at 64, 74;
Philadelphia Tailors at 216; Geneva Shoemakers at 14; Thompsonville Carpet Weavers at 112;
Hunt at 634.
31 Pittsburgh Cordwainers at 56.
36 Id. at 56, 70; Philadelphia Cordwainers at 110, 145, 155-56, 181-85; New York Cord-
wainers at 295-301; Hudson Cordwainers at 292; Hunt at 619, 634. Two closely related argu-
ments were also made often: first, that all indictments for conspiracy at common law had alleged
some element of fraud, deceit or wrongdoing on the part of the defendents, whereas none was
alleged in the instant case (New York Cordwainers at 288-89, 345; Pittsburgh Cordwainers at 57-
58; Hunt at 617, 633-34); and secondly, that all definitions of conspiracy at common law included
either illegal ends or illegal means, whereas no such illegality was or could be charged in the
instant case (Philadelphia Tailors at 200; Thompsonville Carpet Weavers at 111; Geneva Shoe-
makers at 14; Hunt at 617).
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third person, is indictable at common law, is so puerile a mistake, that I feel
distressed to be under the necessity of exposing it. Surely, if men were indicted
for conspiring to build a steam boat, which would indirectly impoverish some
third person, for instance, the master of a passage vessel, the absurdity would be
very glaring. . . . Shall all others, except only the industrious mechanic, be al-
lowed to meet and plot; merchants to determine their prices current, politicians
to electioneer, sportsmen for horseracing and games, ladies and gentlemen for
balls, parties, and banquets; and yet these poor men be indicted for combining
against starvation?3
7
This chimera-like legal definition of conspiracy, as applied to the
workers, ought to have been a very disturbing legal proposition to a
court genuinely interested in upholding democratic life under the rule
of law. I shall show that it was the problem of legitimacy, and not that
of the applicability of the common law crime of conspiracy to Ameri-
can workers, which proved to be the crux of the appellate decision in
Commonwealth v. Hunt.
4. Applicability of Conspiracy
Counsel for the workers placed their primary hope in an interlock-
ing set of four arguments which collectively made the point that, how-
ever criminal conspiracy might be defined, no such crime was applica-
ble per se to labour organizations in their jurisdiction. First, it was
argued, the legislature had not enacted a statutory crime of conspir-
acy.38 (In New York, which did have such a statute, it was argued that
the statute did not by its terms extend to workers and was not intended
to extend so far.39) Second, counsel urged that the several British stat-
utes making labour organizations per se criminal conspiracies had
never been adopted in any of the colonies or the United States, and
that such statutes did not apply to American situations after the decla-
ration of independence unless specifically accepted by a post-Revolu-
tionary legislature.40
Third, in case after case, counsel argued that, apart from the stat-
utes and prosecutions founded upon them, the common law of England
had never made a conspiracy of workers to raise wages a criminal of-
37 New York Cordwainers at 279, 296, 301. Edmonds argued similarly: "It must be a con-
spiracy then for two or more to form a partnership, though the end be to make money and the
means be a union of their funds or their labor!" (see Hudson Shoemakers at 293).
, See Philadelphia Cordwainers at 159, 192, 196; New York Cordwainers at 257; Buffalo
Tailors at 94; Hudson Shoemakers at 308; Hunt at 617, 622.
39 See New York Cordwainers at 257-60; Geneva Shoemakers at 13-14; Hudson Shoemak-
ers at 304-306.
40 Philadelphia Cordwainers at 192; New York Cordwainers at 257, 279, 295; Pittsburgh
Cordwainers at 76; Buffalo Tailors at 94; Hunt at 623.
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fence.41 They argued that every reported English case which antedated
1776 (except one) and which held labourers to the doctrine of conspir-
acy had either been founded upon a statute or blindly followed the ab-
errational case. That single case, the 1721 Journeymen Tailors of
Cambridge prosecution42 - which did contain expansive statements in
favour of a per se common law doctrine - was found in a report noto-
rious for its errors, was quite confused in its reasoning and was essen-
tially dictum since an applicable statute upon which the prosecution
could be viewed as founded (and which was mentioned in the case) had
been enacted the previous year.43 A 1716 treatise which seemed to
make the same point as the 1721 case was discounted on the legal
ground that the words "wrongfully" and "indirectly" used by its author
as a part of his definition of labour conspiracy eliminated any per se
quality from that definition by requiring a court to find either illegal
ends or means before conviction could be entered.44
More expansive and less legal was the closely related fourth point
of the workers: even conceding that at English common law a workers'
confederation was a conspiracy per se, that portion of the English com-
mon law had never been adopted in America and it should not be
adopted.45 Counsel in the first few American conspiracy cases noted
that there was no evidence of American labour conspiracy prosecutions
prior to 1805. Indeed, as Rodney adroitly pointed out, the prosecution's
own evidence adduced in the Philadelphia Cordwainers case showed
that there had been several previous combinations of both master and
journeymen shoemakers in Philadelphia during the previous fifteen
years, as well as strikes in other trades, but not a single instance of
indictment for criminal conspiracy could be demonstrated. 46
41 Philadelphia Cordwainers at 156, 186-88, 190-96, 200; New York Cordwainers at 257,
260-72, 305; Pittsburgh Cordwainers at 62; Buffalo Tailors at 94; Thompsonville Carpet Weav-
ers at 11; Hunt at 623-33. Authority today appears to agree with the legal point made by the
workers (see, e.g., Manchester, supra note 11, at 331-33), but the argument was then and remains
today excessively legalistic (see supra note 8).
42 R. v. Journeymen Tailors of Cambridge (1721), 8 Mod. 10 (K.B.).
43 See Philadelphia Cordwainers at 192-95; Pittsburgh Cordwainers at 59; Hudson Shoe-
makers at 299.
4' Philadelphia Cordwainers at 196; New York Cordwainers at 281-83; Hunt at 628.
41 Philadelphia Cordwainers at 156-59, 188-90; New York Cordwainers at 257, 272-76, 279,
307-309; Pittsburgh Cordwainers at 63-64; Hunt at 619, 622.
46
Were the prosecuting officers of the state asleep all this time? Have they and the grand
jury been slumbering at their posts, and suffered a flagitious, a notorious offence to be
repeated with impunity, and to continue its operation without notice or check? . . . If this
had been an offence against the law of the land, it could not have escaped notice till this
time. . ..
(Philadelphia Cordwainers at 164-65). There had been a few conspiracy indictments, but no
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Even more forcefully, counsel for the workers argued that the
English common law of per se labour conspiracy had no place in the
democratic freedom of America. "The English law, as to acts in re-
straint of trade, is generally local in nature, and not suited to our con-
dition," Rantoul declaimed to the Massachusetts courts.47 Walter For-
ward elaborated the point:
These Statutes with many others ... develop in the clearest light, the absurd
and tyrannical policy of the British government, in relation to the poor and
labouring classes of the community. It is a policy, incompatible with the exis-
tence of freedom, and prostrates every right which distinguishes the citizen from
the slave. . . .Hence, the enormous inequality in the distribution of property in
Great Britain, presenting the perpetual and disgusting contrast of equipage and
rags, of luxury and starvation. I ask whether you are prepared to introduce the
policy of the British government into Pennsylvania!'
8
Professor Sayre, in 1922, attempted to demonstrate that the work-
ers' conspiracy arguments were essentially correct.49 Several years
later, Professor Landis in an equally erudite passage attempted to es-
tablish the notion that labour conspiracy had long been a common law
crime in England because "common law" meant the policy of the gov-
ernment (expressed in its statutes as well as its cases).50 Both authors
missed the workers' point since both legalistically focused upon the
third argument of the workers while ignoring the more rounded, policy-
centred, crucial fourth point. If the common law grows - that is, if
known convictions (see supra note 6 and accompanying text) and no instance was reported or
notorious.
' Hunt at 623.
48 Pittsburgh Cordwainers at 62; see also New York Cordwainers at 261-63. Interestingly,
the blunt rhetorical force of arguments used by counsel in contrasting the difference between the
unequal British conditions of oppression and the supposed equality of American conditions had
considerably softened by the time of the Hudson Shoemakers case in 1836. In that case, Edmonds
made a most vigorous and forceful argument (see text accompanying infra notes 97, 99, 102,
108). Although the general policy of British law was to oppress the working classes (as had been
claimed by Forward), in Edmonds' discourse, he seemed to argue there was a peculiar policy of
oppression which specifically arose from disorder surrounding the accession of a foreigner, George
I, when it was claimed people were "compelled ... to surrender freedom for safety" [Hudson
Shoemakers at 296-98 (quote is from 298), 303]. Rantoul, in Hunt, despite the power of his
words (see text accompanying supra note 47), undermined the argument by urging that the op-
pressive labour conspiracy statutes were essentially feudal in nature, not modern, and that "every-
one of these statutes had a local and temporary cause" (see Hunt at 629), implying that the social
reasons for labour oppression had disappeared in England too. Even as fierce an opponent of the
common law as Rantoul (either by the ideology then acceptable in the courtroom or by the stric-
tures of an early 19th-century American upbringing, which had emphasized equality of opportu-
nity to such a degree that Rantoul was unable to perceive the history, permanence and widespread
diffusion of the policy of oppression of workers) was forced to flatten and enervate the basic "dis-
criminatory-British-conditions-don't-apply-here" argument of the workers so as to make it almost
unrecognizable. It was now much more difficult even to argue class bias openly.
49 Sayre, supra note 1.
50 Landis, supra note 18, at 3-13; see also George, The Combination Laws Reconsidered
(1927), 1 Econ. Hist. 214.
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common law courts are free to accept or reject new common law theo-
ries of liability based upon their judicious estimation of the social worth
of those theories5" - then the workers' legal position rested on the
applicability of the prosecution's per se labour conspiracy theory to the
merits of the "incompatible-with-American-egalitarian-democratic-con-
ditions" class-oriented policy arguments of their counsel. In the Jackso-
nian Age of the Common Man, the courts of the United States rejected
those policy arguments. Apparently, what the workers called the op-
pressive policy of the British common law was quite compatible with
local conditions. The issue of class bias was clearly joined. Whether or
not the courts "consciously" accepted the workers' argument that con-
spiracy only furthered employer oppression,52 their adoption of a per se
labour conspiracy theory openly "subserve[d] the interest of the capi-
talist and employer."53
B. Economic Arguments
1. The Historical Condition of the Workers
The social, political and economic arguments made by the workers
derived more or less directly from their increasingly deteriorating socio-
economic situation.54 Most of those indicted for criminal conspiracy in
51 "It is enough for me that our judges are free to determine what parts of the common law
shall be adopted, and what rejected" [New York Cordwainers at 274 (Sampson)].
11 See infra note 268.
11 Pittsburgh Cordwainers at 62.
For my understanding of the conditions of work, the lifestyle of labourers and the history
of American labour in the period 1775-1860, and for the summary thereof which appears in this
and the succeeding paragraphs of text, see Thompson, Time, Work Discipline and Industrial Cap-
italism (1967), 38 Past & Present 58; Thompson, The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in
the Eighteenth Century (1971), 50 Past & Present 76; Marglin, "What Do Bosses Do? The Ori-
gin and Functions of Hierarchy in Capitalist Production," in Gorz, ed., The Division of Labour
(1976) at 13-53; Nash, supra note 6; Foner, Tom Paine and Revolutionary America (1976);
Steffen, The Mechanics of Baltimore: Workers and Politics in the Age of Revolution, 1763-1812
(1984); Dawley, Class and Community: The Industrial Revolution in Lynn (1976); Faler,
Mechanics and Manufacturers in the Early Industrial Revolution: Lynn, Massachusetts 1780-
1860 (1980); Laurie, Working People of Philadelphia, 1800-1850 (1980); Johnson, A Shop-
keeper's Millenium: Society and Revivals in Rochester, New York, 1815-1837 (1978) esp. at 15-
61, 134-41; Dublin, Women at Work. The Transformation of Work and Community in Lowell,
Massachusetts, 1826-1860 (1979); Gutman, Work, Culture and Society in Industrializing
America 1815-1919 (1973), 78 Am. Hist. Rev. 531; Palmer, Most Uncommon Men: Craft and
Culture in Historical Perspective (1976), 1 Labor/Le Travailleur 5; Smith, The Material Lives of
Laboring Philadelphians, 1750 to 1800 (1981), 38 Win. & Mary Q. 163; Alexander, "Poverty,
Fear, and Continuity: An Analysis of the Poor in Late Eighteenth-Century Philadelphia," in Da-
vis & Hailer, eds., The People of Philadelphia (1973) 13; Stansell, "The Origins of the Sweat-
shop: Women and Early Industrialization in New- York City," in Frisch & Walkowitz, eds.,
Working Class America (1983) 78; Kulik, "Patterns of Resistance to Industrial Capitalism: Pau-
tucket Village and the Strike of 1824," in Cantor, ed., American Working Class Culture: Explo-
rations in American Labor and Social History (1979) 209.
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this period were journeymen artisans in the shoemaking and clothes-
making trades in which traditions of craft and skill existed, ragged and
incomplete compared to those in Europe, but craft traditions neverthe-
less. Apparel-makers, traditionally literate, politically conscious and po-
litically active but among the lowest-ranking of artisans on both social
and economic scales, were also among the first to organize themselves
into protective and benevolent associations (which soon became unions)
and among the first and foremost to support an increase in political
power for the lower sort during the Revolutionary era.
Several factors brought about wrenching and revolutionary
changes in the social organization of these and other sectors of work:
urbanization and the consequent disappearance of most home industry
in the cities; an expanding if relatively inflexible local market; the bur-
geoning of an Atlantic market economy with the advent of its concomi-
tants, the wage relationship and periodic downslides or depressions; the
in-migration of a frustrated and marginalized farm populace; emigra-
tion from overseas; the periodic cut-off of European supply to consum-
ers in the western and southern United States during periods of inter-
national tension or war followed by reintroduction of vigorous
European competition; and the widespread dissemination of an ethos of
proprietary and entrepreneurial commercialization. 56
Within these and other trades, master and journeyman had for-
merly worked and lived together in relatively communal and mutual
harmony, producing what was needed on what we would think of as an
erratic work schedule for a known and proximate market. This lifestyle
began to change drastically, first in the eastern American seaboard
commercial entrep6ts about the time of the Revolution and, then,
spreading throughout the industrializing northeast by the onslaught of
For an engaging and penetrating radical macroeconomic historical treatment, see Gordon et
al., Segmented Work, Divided Workers: The Historical Transformation of Labor in the United
States (1982) esp. at 54-78. These authors, however, place too little emphasis on ideology and
consequently adopt an overly economic definition of "capitalism". Compare id. at 55-56 ("capital-
ism was a revolution yet to come" before the 1820s) with, e.g., Holt, supra note 8, at 704-707
("capitalism. . . was the dominant mode of socio-political relations long before 1800") and Nash,
supra note 3, at 161-62 ("[b]y the late seventeenth century. . . political economists were writing
about the emerging market economy in which individuals responded to economic opportunities as
private persons and operated outside of traditional moral restraints").
*' Smith, supra note 54; Nash, supra note 6, at 324, 369.
"Getting ahead," looking out for oneself, owner control and the rest of what MacPherson
encapsulates into "possessive individualism" were becoming attitudes, traits and behaviours more
socially acceptable than, and increasingly predominant over, other more sociable and more com-
munal, less aspiring attitudes [MacPherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism:
Hobbes to Locke (1962)]. See Appleby, Capitalism and a New Social Order: The Republican
Vision of the 1790's (1984); Appleby, Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth-Century
England (1978).
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the Civil War in 1860. Masters who rose on the social ladder became
merchants and employers, cutting themselves from the life of work and
from the workers; some masters and many jours57 descended, being
transformed into outworkers, factory hands or sweatshop workers.58
Moreover, what had largely been an integrated, holistic and symbiotic
work process jointly engaged in by master and journeyman was strati-
fied relatively suddenly and grindingly. The rising master arrogated to
himself control of the production process - overall direction, design
and marketing became "his". The tasks of cutting, piecing and sewing
were divided and parcelled out to different tiers of workers. Children
and women were brought from outside the craft and thrust into those
newly excised and truncated tasks, which required the lowest skills of
the trade. Strangers without skill (such as free blacks, rural in-mi-
grants and foreign immigrants) were also introduced by employers into
the production process, largely in competition with jours, who conse-
quently believed that the newcomers were damaging the reputation of
their craft with shoddy work as well as taking bread from their
mouths.5 9
Masters began to emphasize quantity and supervisory control in
place of quality and co-operation. Labour was slowly being transformed
from a "lifestyle" into a "cost". Real wages began to fall for many
artisans. Journeymen began to come face-to-face with a routine and
regularized work life of subordination, which offered little hope of ad-
vancement to the status of master, and which was without the prospect
of building up a "competency" (savings) for their old age. Not only
had work in the stitching trades become segmented, with task-confined
workers massed together and sometimes away from the presence of
their employer, but by the end of the period, journeymen no longer
lived with or close by masters: one class had become two, mutual inter-
ests had been sundered, lifestyles had diverged. Even as early as 1789,
in the great parade of the citizenry of Philadelphia to celebrate the new
57 "Jours" is short for "journeymen". Originally, "journeyman" was the middle stage in the
medieval artisan hierarchy of skill levels (preceded by apprenticeship and followed, if one were
good enough, by "master") and the term had little or nothing to do with the way in which work or
access to markets was organized. After the transformation of their lifestyles, "jours" meant those
artisans to whom employers (many perhaps still called "masters") paid wages.
" Bruce Laurie provides a succinct and useful distinction between "outworkers", factory
hands and "sweaters" - and gives other definitions necessary to obtain a better understanding of
the work situation of artisans and mechanics between 1790 and 1860 (see Laurie, supra note 54,
at 15-27; note particularly
the conclusions that can be drawn about workers in the "clothing"
and "shoes" categories in Tables 1, 2 & 3, id. at 14, 16, 17).
" Thus, the sexism, racism and ethnocentrism which characterized the labour movement in
general in this period had a socio-economic component.
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Constitution, journeymen marched separately from masters in two
trades.60 The rapid development of distant markets, as was made clear
by the testimony of the employer John Bedford in the 1806 Philadel-
phia Cordwainers case," exacerbated and accelerated the processes of
industrialization, worker impoverishment, labour division and class
division.
While complete data is difficult to discover, it is likely that urban
shoemakers and clothesmakers in the northeastern United States par-
ticipated to some extent in the increased commercial prosperity of the
middle and late 1790s. 6 2 Emerging workers at that time at least seemed
to have an economic strength roughly equal to that of their emerging
bosses; the Philadelphia journeymen cordwainers were quickly victori-
ous in several 1790s strikes for higher wages and, in a more lengthy
and bitter dispute in 1799, they were able to prevent the masters from
combining to reduce wages.63 However, these successes did not mean
that the jours were obtaining a "fair share". 4 Relative equality of
strength in struggle did not mean something approaching relative
equality of per capita wealth among masters and jours, nor that wealth
differentials were stable or narrowing, nor that victory brought even
minimal ease, much less plenty.
60 Foner, supra note 54, at 280n.
61 Bedford's shop was boycotted by the journeyman cordwainers union long after the termi-
nation of the strike/lockout of 1799 (see supra note 4), because Bedford refused to fire his two
jours who had "scabbed". Bedford's workforce was thereby decimated, but with that peculiar
stubbornness of well-off anti-union people he continued to employ the two scabs for at least eigh-
teen months, despite being forced to move his shop to Trenton temporarily. Bedford testified:
[T]hey scabbed [boycotted] my shop . . . .From having twenty-four journeymen, I was
now reduced to four or five. . . .Some time afterward, my little capital being laid out in
stock, and no way of vending it at home, an idea struck me of going to the southward and
endeavour there to force [sic] a sale. I went to Charleston at the risque of my life. . . . I
put my articles at an extremely low price, by which I had but little profit, in order to
linduce people to deal with me. I got two customers at Charleston, from there I went to
Norfolk, Petersburg, Richmond, and Alexandria; and in all of those places I obtained cus-
tomers . . . . [B]usiness became a little brisk, and the journeymen turned out [struck]
again; on which account I was forced to raise the price of the work I had stipulated to
perform. I did not want to make any profit on the rise, but yet I was obliged to raise my
price to the same extent: by this I lost two customers ....
[Philadelphia Cordwainers at 100-101; see also id. at 73-81, 94-95 (testimony of the two scabbing
jours)]. Laurie states that the second job action against Bedford (the "turn out") occurred be-
cause the jours were not invited to share wage increases in the profit derived from the new south-
ern trade (see Laurie, supra note 54, at 6-7).
62 For the evidence of the increased prosperity, see, e.g., Gordon et al., supra note 54, at 49.
"[C]ordwainers' actual and real wages [in Philadelphia] . . . more than doubled in 1793 and
remained relatively high [until at least 1800]" (Smith, supra note 54, at 194).
'3 See supra note 4.
" Prices had also begun to rise, and one master testified that, on each pair of "fancy boots",
he received an amount of profit equal to or greater than the wages he gave to the jour who made
them. Philadelphia Cordwainers at 125-26.
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"Late colonial Philadelphia was hardly an egalitarian paradise,"
Bruce Laurie has concluded.6 5 "Unskilled workers and journeymen in
the 'lesser' crafts in Philadelphia often encountered very serious diffi-
culties in meeting their families' basic needs," echoes Billy G. Smith,
whose careful study focused explicitly upon cordwainers, among other
crafts.66 "Only in the best of times, [such as] the late 1790s, could
male heads of [cordwainer] household[s] . . . earn enough money to
pay for basic necessities." As with the official poverty statistics of to-
day, Smith's calculations are based upon a minimal, spartan standard
of living. Many jours lived on the brink of economic disaster, even in
the relatively prosperous late 1790s.67
Hard-pressed families ate more grains, doubled or tripled up in houses, went
without essential clothing, shivered through winters with insufficient fuel, fore-
went smallpox inoculation but were unable to flee the city in [the frequent] times
of epidemic .... The specter of poverty and deprivation haunted their
lives .... If this were the best poor man's country for urban laboring people at
the time (and that remains a disputed question), it still was a world requiring
constant vigilance and struggle to survive."
Since "master cordwainers. . . enjoyed a more comfortable existence"
thanks to the upswing of the 1790s,19 the journeymen vigilantly used
their combined economic strength to attempt to re-allocate some of
that prosperity to themselves. At least in the beginning of their struggle
with the masters, they held their own.
Around the turn of the century (if, again, we can take the story of
the Philadelphia cordwainers as indicating a pattern in at least these
two apparel-producing industries), economic conditions became consid-
erably worse for workers. The journeymen shoemakers of Philadelphia
struck only once between 1799 and 1805, and they waited more than
nine months to retaliate after the masters rolled wages back during the
winter of 1804-1805 (in contrast to the quick job action taken against
the masters' rollback-and-lockout of 1799).70 Even then, the decision to
strike made in October 1805 was uncharacteristically opposed by a
substantial minority of the membership, despite the fact that the ma-
jority proposed to ask only for the wages currently being paid in Balti-
65 Laurie, supra note 54, at 11; Pessen, "Wealth in America Before 1865," in Rubenstein,
ed., Wealth and the Wealthy in the Modern World (1980) at 167-90.
66 Smith, supra note 54, at 201.
67 Id.
18 Id. at 201, 202. For the extraordinary unhealthiness of Philadelphia even by 18th century
standards, see Smith, Death and Life in a Colonial Immigrant City: A Demographic Analysis of
Philadelphia (1977), 37 J. Econ. Hist. 863 at 870-80, 887-89.
4' Smith, supra note 54, at 201.
70 See supra note 4.
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more and New York; and upon the strike vote a large portion of the
dissenters left the union. 1 While the economic position of the jours was
never solid, it had apparently rapidly weakened, probably because of
the many new distant markets, and perhaps because of the beginning of
the temporary eclipse of Philadelphia in favour of Baltimore and New
York as commercial and entrepreneurial centres. Also, masters had
greater strength.
Capitalist producers ... had certain inherent advantages. Unlike the conserva-
tive, slow-to-change craftsmen, the new capitalists were intent upon exploiting
the possibilities opened up by social change .... [I]n shoemaking, it was the
capitalists who saw the possibilities in producing heavy boots for the western
miners and cheaper shoes for the Southern market, and their control over these
markets gave them much leverage to force journeymen shoemakers to accept
their terms. 72
Following the loss of their bitter November 1805 strike, the cord-
wainer jours angrily retaliated by establishing co-operative shoemaking
arrangements in an attempt to compete with their "masters".7 3 This
venture failed,7 4 unfortunately drowned without another trace in the
current of capitalist development. Thirty years later, in 1835, shoemak-
ing conditions in Philadelphia were pathetic, wages had been deci-
mated, hours of work had increased, factory conditions under the con-
trol of the "cunning men of the East" (merchant-capitalists) had
emerged, and production had become geared to cheap work, stockpiling
and complete employer control. 5 Union organization, so strong in the
1794-1806 period, had apparently disappeared at some point in the
interim.
With the increasing divorce of skilled workers from the creative
and co-operative control of their whole endeavour, and with the contin-
71 In a series of close votes in Oct. 1805, the Philadelphia Cordwainers were determined not
only to get back the substantial 120 per pair of shoes they had lost the previous winter, but also to
have a general advance of wages up to the scale, then prevailing in Baltimore and New York.
Apparently about forty dissenting members left the union after the vote to strike (Philadelphia
Cordwainers at 81, 82, 90, 117, 122, 124, 129, 138).
72 Gordon et al., supra note 54, at 57-58; see also supra note 61.
73 The workers founded the co-operative (the second workers' co-operative in Philadelphia)
after
[t]he unprecedented trial which issued in their conviction, as well as [because of] the un-
fortunate circumstances in which they found themselves after so long a contest .... They
have been compelled to resort to this undertaking as the only expedient left them to main-
tain themselves and families from the most abject dependence.
(Philadelphia Aurora [and] General Advertiser, Apr. 28, 1806; see Saposs, supra note 3, at 127-
30). Rodney (in argument) had hinted that such a venture might ensue if the workers were con-
victed (Philadelphia Cordwainers at 199).
7' For its failure, see Philadelphia Pennsylvanian, Apr. 4, 1835; Commons, "Introduction to
Volumes III and IV," in 3 Documentary History at 40.
75 Id. at 39-41 (the quote is from Philadelphia Pennsylvanian, Apr. 4, 1835).
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uing destruction of their artisan way of life, there came a distinct
downturn in an already insecure economic position. This contrasted
harshly with the huge fortunes and lavish way of life which many in
the commercial, professional, financial and manufacturing elite were
able to amass and display.76 Once proud and quasi-independent jour-
neymen cordwainers and tailors had been steamrollered into wage-
earners, who had control over nothing but the sale of their own la-
bour.7 7 The introduction of advanced technology - the sewing ma-
chine - into these trades in the early 1850s merely completed this
devastating conversion of craftsmen into cogs of an industrial machine.
76 See Laurie, supra note 54, at 11-13; Williamson & Lindert, American Inequality (1980)
at 67-76; Pessen, supra note 64; Pessen, "The Egalitarian Myth and American Social Reality," in
Pessen, ed., The Many-Faceted Jacksonian Era (1977) at 7-46.
'" See Ware, The Industrial Worker 1840-1860 (1924) at 26-55 ("The Degradation of the
Worker"); Gordon et al., supra note 54, at 66:
"Prices" - that is to say, the craftsman's piece rate - fell in real terms. Pressure to
increase output and [to] cut corners in production increased. The independent producers
and small shops had difficulty keeping afloat. Pauperism spread, and the specter of poverty
confronted tradesmen who lost their means of support.
Further, consider Ken Foster's comment on the theoretical question of the appropriate label to
place upon the sale of the workers' labour into an employment bondage (in the guise of an em-
ployment contract):
The "employment contract" in the nineteenth century did not refer:to a specific series of
contractual relationships nor to a set of known principles which governed the mutual rights
and liabilities of the parties to the contract. It was a fiction, in its modern sense, which
when used, and distinguished from other contracts by the element of control of a worker by
an employer, was used to determine external rights and duties of third parties and not of
the contracting parties themselves. . . . The internal relationship between employer and
worker was governed by a concept of "service", sometimes specifically personal service,
which denoted a relationship freely entered into by contractual agreement but which there-
after was a unilateral and hierarchical relation ....
"Served" is a passive verb emphasizing the workers' action in offering themselves as
being of use to the employer. Additionally, "service" . . . implies the acceptance of author-
ity and discipline together with a degree of self-sacrifice or recognition of higher values
rather than a narrow self-interested instrumentalism ...
[T]he obligations of the worker are open-ended and diffuse. It is not possible usually
to define with any specificity the nature of the tasks to be performed, the level of the
intensity of the work, nor the general adequacy of the worker with the degree of precision
that Victorian judges would have required in order to translate the worker's general diffuse
obligations into specific contractual terms . . . . It is undoubtedly accepted that a worker
is under the control and command of the employer, and judges have always been prepared
to imply a duty on the worker to obey orders.
["The Legal Form of Work in the Nineteenth Century: The Myth of Contract?" (unpub. paper
delivered at the Conference on Law, Labour and Crime held at the University of Warwick
[U.K.], Sept. 1983)]. Foster notes that "employment contracts" in the nineteenth-century contra-
dicted each of three fundamental attributes of classically-defined contract law: "a voluntary and
mutual acceptance of obligations by two parties"; "reciprocity"; and the notion that "contractual
obligations are specified and limited by the agreement". Foster concludes that English courts'
"continuing. . . use of the term 'contract of service'. . . emphasized the voluntary acceptance by
workers of a subordinate role within an unquestioned system of discipline and authority in indus-
try" (id.). Of course, such acceptance was "voluntary" only in the sense that workers had the
option to starve, if they chose not to accept one or another such "contract" or if they chose not to
be docile and inert after such "acceptance".
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The jours did not, of course, accept such a revolution in their lives
meekly and easily. In the 1770s and 1780s, wages, conditions of work
and relations with masters were added to the other social problems they
undertook to deal with through mutual benefit societies (called "un-
ions" herein). Beginning in the 1790s, strikes, boycotts and other job
actions became more frequent as skilled labour was still scarce. In the
latter part of the period under consideration, labour organization had
periods of dramatic growth, and one of the cycles culminated in the
National Trades Union Society of the 1830s which figured prominently
in three of the conspiracy cases.78
2. Ideological Divisions Among the Workers
Worker rhetoric protesting the changes in their condition con-
tained mixed and somewhat contradictory strains, reflecting the contra-
dictory attitudes, history and conditions of these working people. At the
time of the Revolution, artisan ideology had been an amalgam of re-
publicanism, laissez-faire liberalism and radical millenarialism.7 9
Labour historians Paul Faler, Alan Dawley and Bruce Laurie per-
ceive a rough division of urban American skilled workers during the
1820s and for several decades thereafter into three types: "traditional-
ists", who tended to accept hierarchy but to reject laissez-faire liber-
alism and to whom the erratic and marginal but communal craft cul-
ture of their recent past now seemed like a golden age; "loyalists" or
"revivalists", who accepted and internalized the new capitalist work
ethic with its promise of upward mobility, but who would fight for their
share of the pie; and "rebels" or "radicals" who wished to apply com-
munalistic solutions to many of the hierarchical problems produced by
what we now know to be the advent of entrepreneurial and industrial
capitalism but who, as children of the Enlightenment, accepted a ra-
tionalist outlook which approved of technological development.80 Not
yet socialists,
these [radical] dissenters were not neophytic factory hands or proletarians, but
veteran artisans who shaped an independent culture in the autonomy accompany-
78 See Hudson Shoemakers at 285-86; New York Tailors at 317, 319, 330-32; Philadelphia
Plasterers at 339-40 (all decided in 1836); and infra notes 168, 172, 193, 200, 207 and accompa-
nying text. On the trade union movement of the 1830s, see generally Mittelman, Trade Unionism
(1833-1839), in Commons et al., supra note 3, at 333-484; Laurie, supra note 54, at 85-104.
79 See Foner, supra note 54, at 28-45; Appleby, The Social Origins of American Revolution-
ary Ideology (1978), 64 J. Am. Hist. 935; Crowley, This Sheba, Self. The Conceptualization of
Economic Life in Eighteenth-Century America (1974) at 76-85.
80 Dawley & Faler, "Workinglass Culture and Politics in the Industrial Revolution: Sources
of Loyalism and Rebellion," in American Workingclass Culture, supra note 54, at 61-75; Laurie,
supra note 54, at 33-83 et passim.
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ing handicraft production. Nor were they upwardly mobile workers or "expectant
capitalists" clamoring for greater opportunity in the name of radicalism ...
They aimed for a competency, and seemed less riled over narrowing opportuni-
ties than over growing inequality and the steady decrement of artisanship and
independence.81
The radical workers were ardent republicans, full of a sense of dignity
and relatively well-educated. They were "repelled by the horrors of
poverty and the intellectual deadening produced by overwork ...
[and] endorsed any form of collective action that might alleviate these
conditions." 2
As rationalists and practitioners of a discrete way of life, they recognized the
cultural side of industrialism and distinguished, but did not separate, the cultural
and the material. Their touchstones were economic and cultural, and they em-
ployed both in putting forward a holistic critique of emerging industrial society.83
They took this view since their whole of working life, and not merely
the terms and conditions of work, was being disrupted and
revolutionized. 8'
Radicals had no qualm about private property, but they did object to excessive
accumulation on the part of individuals and corporate entities and to the concen-
tration of power at the top of society [; they] despised economic individualism
and proposed to redress the growing maldistribution of wealth and power
through collective worker action at the polls and at workplaces. 85
By and large it was the rhetoric and position of the radicals who were
the leaders of the unions and generally the force behind organized pro-
test and job actions until the 1840s, which was advanced before the
courts.
3. Themes in the Workers' Arguments
Loss of worker independence, the draining of self-esteem, the low-
ering of communal estimation of their worth, and a refusal to be sub-
jected to the arbitrary control of their bosses were the primary themes
of the workers' counsel throughout the labour conspiracy cases. The
masters "are grinding down the men whom they employ, to little more
than nothing, and pocketing their services," counsel for the Philadel-
81 Id. at 75.
82 Id. at 100.
83 Id. at 75.
" Id. See also Pessen, Most Uncommon Jacksonians: The Radical Leaders of the Early
Labor Movement (1967) at 28-32, 44-51; Early, A Reappraisal of the New England Labour
Reform Movement of the 1840's: The Lowell Female Labour Reform Association and the New
England Workingmen's Association (1980), 25 Hist. Sociale/Social Hist. 33.
85 Laurie, supra note 54, at 78.
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phia Tailors argued.86
The master assumed the right of limiting those whom they employed, at all
times, and under all circumstances. . .; without consulting the interests, or
wishes of the workmen, or permitting them to have a voice upon the question. To
this state of slavish subordination, the journeymen refused to submit. They con-
ceived that every man being the sole owner, and master of his own goods and
labour, had a right to affix the price of them .... 87
"[The masters here," said Sampson, "seem to think the journeyman
bound to serve them through life, for whatever wages they choose to
grant them. . . . Who are the defendants' masters?. . . [The defen-
dants] are poor, honest workingmen, it is true, but not slaves.""8 Rod-
ney, speaking to the Philadelphia Cordwainers jury, emphasized
through hyperbole the degrading degree of control over their whole
lives which the workers encountered and abhorred in the new relations
of work:
The masters, I suppose, will then select at pleasure the houses in which we must
board .... They may fix our diet .... If they can determine the quality, they
can determine the quantity and I expect we shall have our food weighed out to us
like a soldier's rations .... 89
At the core of the workers' position in the cases, just as it was the
core of radical workers' thought," was the labour theory of value. They
believed that the hard work of those who toiled with their hands pro-
duced all the value in the world, and that employers illicitly pried some
of that value away from workers by arrogating the right to establish
wages without worker concurrence. "[T]he principle is undeniable, that
labour constitutes the real wealth of a country," said Rodney."" The
workers' consternation was heightened by their republican ideology:
they supposedly lived in a country "founded on the equal rights of
men," 92 where a golden age which recognized true worth was finally
not only possible but actually in existence. Yet, the oppressive and ava-
ricious policies of the employers, which tended to intrude dangerously
into and to destroy that egalitarian scheme of things, were about to
gain acceptance in the law. The masters, they were certain, wanted to
86 Philadelphia Tailors at 204.
87 Philadelphia Cordwainers at 111 (Franklin) (reporter's paragraphing disregarded).
" New York Cordwainers at 293, 310.
89 Philadelphia Cordwainers at 197.
90 See Laurie, supra note 54, at 76.
"I Philadelphia Cordwainers at 180; see also Pittsburgh Cordwainers at 62 (Forward),
quoted in text accompanying infra note 106.
2 New York Cordwainers at 279 (Sampson).
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introduce British tyrannies of class inequality.93 As the country gained
independence and freedom, workers paradoxically lost theirs.
The primary themes did not emerge slowly over the course of the
period under study; rather, they were a constant for the workers,
against which the revolutionary "progress" of the age could be sadly
judged. They were set forth in the "vindication", which the Philadel-
phia Journeymans' Cordwainers Society published during their strike
in November 1805," and the same chords were struck by labour leader
Frederick Robinson in his Independence Day address to the workers of
Boston in 1834.95
The concomitant rise in employer wealth and worker poverty, and
the disparity of power thereby produced, was another theme of the
workers' counsel, but here a tension emerged in their analysis. To what
extent were these wealth and power differentials curable, to what ex-
tent were they permanent in the existing economic system? To what
extent were they recent and sudden developments, perhaps British im-
ports, to what extent were they the extrusions of tendencies embedded
in the American economic heritage of laissez-faire capitalism itself?
On the one hand, workers' counsel took the position that an equi-
table balance between worker and employer could be achieved if, and
only if, judges, juries and the law were fair, refusing to side with one
party in a controversy. "Leave the regulation of these things to the
open market," Rodney pleaded in 1806; "there every article, like water,
acquires its natural level." '98 A ruling in favour of the defendants, their
counsel Edmonds urged upon a jury in 1836, "will leave trade to regu-
late itself by the mutual freedom from partial restraints of both em-
ployer and the workmen." 97 Rantoul's co-counsel noted that "it has
93 Pittsburgh Cordwainers at 62 (Forward), quoted in text accompanying supra note 50, and
infra note 107.
94
The Master Shoemakers, as they are called after the slavish style of Europe, but who are
only the retailers of our labor and who in truth live upon the work of our hands, are
generally men of large property, to whom the suspension of business, though it is a loss, is
not so great a loss as the total suspension of the means of subsistence, is to us who obtain
our income from week to week. These masters. . . who would be masters and tyrants if
they could. . . suppose that they have a right to limit us at all times, and whatever may be
the misfortune of society, the changes in the value of necessaries, the increase or decrease
of trade, they think they have the right to determine for us the value of our labor; that we
have no right to determine ourselves, what we will or what we will not take in exchange for
our labor . . ..
(Philadelphia Aurora [and] General Advertiser, Nov. 28, 1805, also quoted in text accompanying
supra note 9).
95 See text accompanying supra note 21.
" Philadelphia Cordwainers at 199; see also id. at 180.
9 Hudson Shoemakers at 304.
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been the custom of the people of this country to combine for any and
every purpose not criminal or forbidden by law,"9 8 and Edmonds
pointed out that the combination of capital was the very means by
which American prosperity was being accelerated. 99 Indeed, as several
counsel emphasized, the whole purpose of union was to defend workers
against the strength which combination gave to the employers.100
"What would have been the condition of the journeymen, had their
association never been formed?" Forward queried. Answering his own
question, he concluded that the formation of the union "enabled them
to meet the employers on a footing of equality."101 Only by combina-
tion could the workers realistically participate in the marketplace and
help conditions achieve that balance which liberal economic theory rep-
resented to be necessary both for contract-making and for prosperity.
After a lengthy and quite modern-sounding argument that labour strife
produced essentially no net economic loss to the community (viewed as
a whole), and that economic foolhardiness by workers would be pun-
ished by severe economic harm to them through the normal workings of
the market, Edmonds concluded: "The mischief is . . . that you will
attempt to keep any one class down to old values and thus exclude
them from a just participation in the general prosperity."102
Little hint of permanent imbalance or immiseration emanated
from such laissez-faire notions, which indeed were much more in keep-
ing with liberal economic theory than were the paternalistic, domineer-
ing and arrogant arguments of the employers. 03 It ought to have been
a mystery to twentieth-century legal historians why the courts failed to
accept, or at least failed to give reasonable credence to, such well-or-
dered, apposite, forward-looking and danger-free laissez-faire argu-
mentation.
On the other hand, the actual imbalance which existed between
employers and the urban craft workers' increasingly powerless and mis-
98 Hunt at 619.
Hudson Shoemakers at 293.
100 Philadelphia Cordwainers at 147 (Franklin); New York Cordwainers at 371; New York
Hatters at 146; Philadelphia Tailors at 147-48; Hudson Shoemakers at 303.
201 Pittsburgh Cordwainers at 65, 68.
101 Hudson Shoemakers at 306-307 (quote at 307).
103 See Turner, supra note 12, at 21-28, 36-39. It is impossible to attribute these laissez-faire
notions wholly to either the contradictory amalgam of beliefs espoused by radical labour leaders
(see text accompanying supra note 85), or to the ideology of the lawyers themselves, or perhaps to
a strain of "loyalist" or "revivalist" worker ideology (see text accompanying supra note 80) which
might have been advanced in litigation strategy sessions. It must be remarked upon that very few
Americans in the period 1805-1842 perceived laissez-faire liberalism and free-market growth to
be radically contradictory to egalitarian human freedom.
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erable position also found its way into counsel's arguments. It was
noted that the American economy, as perceived by economically
weaker participants rather than by observers or bosses, resembled war-
fare rather than harmony. Since the first cordwainer strike in Pitts-
burgh "six or seven years ago," Forward said, "there has been a per-
petual conflict between the two parties. '10 4 "The masters have been
completely triumphant" in winning the 1805 strike, Rodney observed.
"They have already accomplished all they asked, what can they desire
more? Is it their wish to alarm, terrify, and persecute us, until they
reduce us to the servile state of vassals?" 105 Counsel in Philadelphia
Tailors, speaking three decades after Rodney, found a clear and hier-
archical division between boss and employee, one which harboured per-
manent marginality for the latter:
[A] combination of master workmen, men of high character and credit, with all
the influence which their patronage gives them, will be irresistable .... [T]heir
workmen. . ., with means and resources in every way inadequate to such a con-
test, will soon be compelled to retract demands however just, and submit to inju-
ries however galling .... The law should be more severe with masters than with
men, and that in proportion to the means of individuals to encroach upon its
sacred limits. The masters are more dangerous than the men .... Every jour-
neyman expects to become a master ... but few masters expect again to be-
come journeymen .... [W]hen the masters form a combination, they have no
regard to the situation of their journeymen, because they never expect to share
with them in their perils, or pains .... 06
The permanence and horrors of class division in England were seeping
into America. "[W]hence comes this recent dread of associations
among the laboring classes?" Forward asked.
[D]o the master manufacturers in our cities and large towns begin to feel that
spirit which pervades the same class of men in Great Britain? ... [The British
policy] may subserve the interests of the capitalists and employers, but [it]
grinds to the earth a numerous class of people from whose toil their wealth is
obtained.107
By about 1842, it had begun to appear to many workers that the
new conditions of work in urban America were lowering them into a
second-class status of poverty, ignorance and discontent. Edmonds
forcefully argued to the jury that, with a conviction,
You will condemn the journeyman to such incessant toil, merely for his daily
bread, . . . you will deprive him of the means and the opportunity of learning
the rights and duties which he is to exercise, as a citizen, for your welfare and
104 Pittsburgh Cordwainers at 65.
10 Philadelphia Cordwainers at 202.
0 Philadelphia Tailors at 148, 203-204.
107 Pittsburgh Cordwainers at 62, 64-65. But see supra note 48.
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mine, as much as for his own. How can you expect him to love the country,
which does not afford him adequate protection?108
In the first decade of the century, these lawyers advanced feisty argu-
ments that the workers, who viewed themselves to be at least the moral
equals of their employers, were being deprived of their just rewards. By
the 1830s, their arguments had become transmuted into shrill pleas to
grant redress for workers who, shaken and lacking self-esteem but still
grasping at it, had been forced to the edge of hopelessness. 109 An un-
dercurrefit of immiseration and of class warfare pervades the argu-
ments throughout the period, becoming increasingly plaintive and
intense.
Moreover, at times it appeared that judges were considered, by the
lawyers, as being members of the same oppressive class as masters.
Sampson went so far as almost to accuse the court of siding with the
opposition, 110 and further pointedly noted that judges in England,
drawn from the rich, the noble and the powerful, were "justices who
never laboured [but had become] the judges of the poor man's la-
bour."111 Rantoul read to the trial judge several pages from that part
of his Oration at Scituate which condemned the arbitrariness and inev-
itably "aristocratical" nature of the judicial legislation which consti-
tutes the common law process. Included was the following: "Judge-
made law is special legislation. The judge is human, and feels the bias
which the coloring of the particular case gives." 112
Perhaps the judges were put off by the threatening undercurrents
108 Hudson Shoemakers at 303.
108 Concomitantly, a social distance appeared between workers and their counsel. In his rhet-
oric in 1806, Rodney had declared himself to be a worker, speaking in terms of the positions "we"
take and the oppression done to "us" (see, e.g., text supra note 89). Sampson, responding to a
thrust that the shoemakers of New York in 1809 might be earning too much, replied warmly:
I do not think any man a good witness to that point but one who has himself laboured. If
either of the gentlemen who opposed to us will take his situation in the garret or cellar of
one of these industrious men, get a leather apron and a strap, a last, a lap-stone and a
hammer, and peg or stitch from five in the morning till eight in the evening, and feed and
educate his family with what he so earns, then if he will come into court and say upon his
corporal oath that he was, during that probation, too much pampered or indulged, I will
consider whether these men [defendants] may not be extortioners.
(New York Cordwainers at 279-80). But in a later case, by contrast, Edmonds closed by telling
the jury almost literally how some of his best friends were workers, while Rantoul's lengthy ora-
tion (reported to us by an extremely anti-labour judge, it is true) appears entirely impersonal and
abstracted from the world of intersubjective relations (see also supra note 48).
110 See New York Cordwainers at 372-73.
l Id. at 270.
1 Rantoul, "Oration at Scituate," in Howe, Readings in American Legal History (1952)
472 at 475 (delivered July 4, 1836). For its inclusion in Rantoul's argument in Hunt (since.such is
not indicated by the reported case, in which a prejudiced judge was the reporter), see Nelles,
Commonwealth v. Hunt (1932), 32 Colum. L. Rev. 1128 at 1143n. Rantoul apparently did not
argue this on appeal.
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of class consciouness in the workers' arguments, but it is more likely
that, given their cold-shoulder treatment of the laissez-faire portions of
those arguments, they were uninterested in whatever the workers had
to say. However, the judges certainly gave evidence by the tone and
import of their rulings, their charges and their opinions, that the class
arguments of workers' counsel were correct and that the class of em-
ployers included themselves. The reported opinions in the conspiracy
cases (at least through the trial court's decision in Hunt) were more
severe on the men than on the masters.113 The law was partial, and this
favouritism put the reputation of the law into disrepute.
III. THE BIAS OF THE JUDGES
Every dispute, whether it originates through a failure to deliver goods, or a rob-
bery, or. . . a trespass on "private" land, creates a danger to the social order as
a whole. Class conflict lies beneath every discrete dispute and the social order
cannot tolerate overt class conflict . . . . The role of the law is to prevent such
conflict from becoming overt, and to assure that if a dispute does break out, it
will be interpreted and resolved according to a system of thought which rein-
states, in the realm of thought, the apparent necessity and legitimacies of normal
practice.
1 1
4
A. Overview
Commons' Documentary History lists seventeen indictments of
labourers for conspiracy in the United States before 1842, and one ad-
ditional case in which an employer brought a civil (tort) action founded
upon the same theory of conspiracy. In each of thirteen instances, we
can perceive enough of the judge's views on the law and the evidence to
form an opinion about his fairness. 115 In these, the judge displayed a
bias in favour of the employers, their profits, entrepreneurship and
property rights or, perhaps more precisely, a bias opposed to the exer-
tion of economic pressure by workers' organizations. In another four
cases, it is impossible to ascertain what the judges' views were. 1 ' In
'"1 This is ironic considering that counsel for the Philadelphia Tailors said: "The law should
be more severe with masters than with men" (see text accompanying supra note 106).
11 Gabel, A Critical Anatomy of the Legal Opinion (1980), 5 ALSA Forum at 8. "[Elvery
lawsuit is a miniature war" [Klein v. Hutton, 49 N.D. 248, 191 N.W. 485 (1922) at 486 (N.W.)].
"' The thirteen are, listed chronologically: Recorder Levy (Philadelphia Cordwainers);
Mayor Radcliff (New York Cordwainers); Presiding Judge Roberts (Pittsburgh Cordwainers)
(second trial); Justice Gibson, sitting at nisi prius on a habeas corpus motion (Carlisle); Judge
Riker (New York Hatters); Recorder Reed (Philadelphia Tailors); Presiding Judge King (Phila-
delphia Spinners); Chief Justice Savage (Geneva Shoemakers); Chief Justice Williams, sitting at
trial (Thompsonville Carpet Weavers); Judge Edwards (New York Tailors); Judge Wilcoxson
(Hudson Shoemakers); Recorder Bouvier (Philadelphia Plasterers); Judge Thacher (Hunt).
116 The four are: Baltimore Cordwainers; Pittsburgh Cordwainers (first trial, 1814); Buffalo
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the eighteenth case there is a similar uncertainty about the judge's
views, but the judge may have acted fairly.117 It is difficult to imagine
that any person, who knew of the workers' plight and heard their argu-
ments, could have drawn the conclusion from the courts' treatment of
workers that the law was evenhanded and neutral. 1"8 The judges in
case after case went noticeably out of their way to declare that the law
was fair and unbiased, perhaps as a reaction to the undercurrents and
overtones of class analysis embedded in the counsel's arguments,
though more likely in order to rebut and repel the intimations of class
bias that wafted up to them from common talk. The judges who were
the most obviously biased were often those who made the loudest
claims of fairness.
The partiality exhibited by the judges was not all of the same in-
tensity or visibility. Three judges were vigorously and almost nastily
opposed to workers' organization, 119 while three more remained rela-
tively gentle but displayed an equally clear and strong bias for the em-
ployers' side of the case. 120 Three more judges were biased against la-
bour organization, but the report of the case does not readily reveal
how vigorously it was displayed.121 Only four of the judges were re-
strained and cautious in their favouritism and, in each instance, the
restraint can be explained by the circumstances of the case.1 22 The par-
adigm instance is probably the attitudes and behaviour of Recorder
Levy in Philadelphia Cordwainers, which will be discussed separately.
Most of the other cases were either from New York or Pennsylvania;
and in each jurisdiction, a peculiar twist renders it useful to collect
those cases for group discussion. This segment of the essay will end
with Judge Thacher's handling of the trial in Hunt, which leads to the
ideological significance of Chief Justice Shaw's considerations on ap-
Tailors, Chambersburg Shoemakers. Steffen has found out nothing about the attitudes of the
judge in Baltimore Cordwainers. See Steffen, supra note 54, at 222-23.
111 See Baltimore Weavers at 269.
1'8 Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 (1977) at 186-88 (differen-
tial handling by state courts of labour contract cases and building contract cases before 1850
"seems to be an important example of class bias").
11" Levy, discussed in text accompanying infra notes 123-46; Savage, discussed in text ac-
companying infra notes 187-91; and Edwards, discussed in text accompanying infra notes 192-99.
120 Radcliff, discussed in text accompanying infra notes 173-78; Roberts, discussed in text
accompanying infra notes 147-53; and Thacher, discussed in text accompanying infra notes 209-
19.
1'2 Riker, discussed in text accompanying infra notes 179-82; King, discussed in text accom-
panying infra notes 167, 171; and Williams, discussed in infra note 208.
2 Gibson, discussed in text accompanying infra notes 154-66; Reed, discussed in text ac-
companying infra notes 167, 169-70; Wilcoxson, discussed in text accompanying infra notes 202-
204; and Bouvier, discussed in text accompanying infra notes 167, 172.
[VOL, 22, No. 4
Labour Conspiracy
peal in that same case.
B. The Philadelphia Cordwainers Case
From the beginning, Recorder Levy left little doubt as to his
prejudices. The prosecution's first witness, Job Harrison, was relating
how he had decided to become a scab when a member of the audience
in the packed and tense courtroom was heard to say: "A scab is a shel-
ter for lice." On the spot, Levy hauled the spectator before the bench
and fined him ten dollars (perhaps a week's income for a fully em-
ployed jour) and ordered him "to pay the -money immediately or be
committed. ' ' 123 A short while later, the judge plied Bedford, one of the
stubborn anti-labour employers who had instituted the conspiracy in-
dictments, with some friendly leading questions: "Considering this busi-
ness [cordwaining] on a large scale, as it operates on the city and port
of Philadelphia, is it not a very essential injury, to raise the prices of
such necessary articles on the citizens; and does it not tend to diminish
the exports?" 124 Levy looked down his nose at a worker who used the
word "damned" in his testimony, even though the worker was reporting
a conversation; he badgered the defence lawyers because a copy of the
Journeymen Cordwainer Society's constitution was not produced, but
then declined to order its production; and he joined in the examination
of a master who testified favourably for the workers, attempting to den-
igrate his testimony. 25
Levy gave the defence attorneys a hard time; he attempted to cut
off their opening remarks when reference was made to the vagueness of
the indictment.126 He twice asked Rodney to argue a crucial legal
point, but gave little indication that he listened to Rodney's response. 27
As evidence, he allowed enormous amounts of prosecution testimony
about events of past strikes and controversies between the master and
journeymen cordwainers;1 28 he became unsettled when the defence at-
torneys attempted to point out the legal irrelevance of this testimony to
an 1805 strike;129 then he contradictorily threw in his own objection on
23 Philadelphia Cordwainers at 82-83.
124 Id. at 202.
125 Id. at 115, 116-117, 126-27.
126 Id. at 144.
127 See id. at 191, 196, 200.
128 See id. at 76.
129 The workers' attorneys said that much of the evidence which dealt with events prior to
1805 was legally "irrelevant to the subject," and should thus have been eliminated after objection.
After the court ruled against them, they did not continue to object, putting the best face on their
disappointment by claiming to desire "not to suppress a single instance .. .[so] that the whole
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grounds of irrelevance when the defence tried to prove that a master
cordwainers' association had been in existence since 1789.130 Rodney's
closing argument to the jury drew another biased interruption from the
bench.131 Rodney then reminded the jury most forcefully that they, not
the court, were the judges of law as well as of fact. "You are bound by
the most solemn and sacred obligations, to guard and to watch with
vestal vigilance your privileges."132
In Levy's charge to the jury, there was heightened awareness that
the room was filled with workers, that he was in an uncomfortably dis-
tinct minority, but that he must retain control over the proceedings; he
urged the jury to ignore Rodney's class arguments:
We live in a country where the will of no individual ought to be, or is admitted to
be, the rule of action .... The moment courts of justice lose their respectability,
from that moment the security of persons and of property is gone. The moment
courts of justice have their characters contaminated by a well founded suspicion,
that they are governed by caprice, fear or favour; from that moment they will
cease to be able to administer justice with effect .... It is immaterial to our
consideration whether the defendants are employers or employed, poor or
rich .... If [the jury] decide one way when one man is implicated, and another
when twenty [are implicated] the rights, the liberties and privileges of man in
society, can no longer be protected within these hallowed walls. Numbers would
decide all questions of duty and property. .... 13
truth should be disclosed" (Id. at 76).
130 See id. at 129.
131
[Rodney declaimed: ... The employers] grasp at too much! They are not satisfied with
the rapid rate at which they are at present amassing wealth .... They may destroy the
source from whence the golden streams flow. They may, and I believe, will banish every
good workmen from this city, if they continue this system of persecution with success. You,
gentlemen, may stop their career .... If you do not protect us by your verdict, the court
must and will punish us .... Those workmen who are not chained to the spot will fly the
city; and we who are bound, like victims to the altar, would prefer banishment, to a sen-
tence that may consign us to a prison for years, and deprive us of credit and character for
life!
MR. RECORDER .... If the jury listen to the fact and the law, and are satisfied to find
a verdict of guilty, they are not to consider the punishment. That is the province of the
court .... If the masters are criminal for a combination, as has been intimated, they are
equally liable upon conviction to punishment. The law is equal to all, rich and poor. The
right of association is also equal. You ought not to address their passions on a point of law.
MR. RODNEY. Sir, I am incapable of touching the feelings, or exciting the passions of
the jury .... It is not my interest, nor would it comport with my character ... to stir up
any opposition against the due course of proceedings, or the legal, settled practice of the
court. . . . I have a right to expatiate on the extreme hardships of my clients' case, of
which you must be sensible. The court listened to the mournful tale of Mr. Bedford's losses,
and the melancholy story of Mr. Harrison's distresses [the two prosecution witnesses men-
tioned above]. If it were not regular to permit the jury to hear these doleful ditties, why
was the counsel suffered to recite them? ... I must be permitted to reply, that they lose a
little money and we lose our living.
(Id. at 202-203).
1 Id. at 204.
133 Id. at 224-25.
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While telling jurors not to listen to their feelings or prejudices, the
judge indulged in his own. The warning of Rodney that the court would
attempt to take the decision on the law away from the jury was
fulfilled.1 3 4
Rodney's view, that the common law crime of labour conspiracy
was "an attack upon the rights of man", was peremptorily ruled "un-
necessary and improper."'1 35 The judge praised the common law's rules
as "the result of the wisdom of the ages. .. [which] regulates with a
sound discretion most of our concerns in civil and social life." 136 Some-
how magically cleansed of any implication of bias toward the rich or
unfairness toward the worker, this neutral common law, "the will of the
whole community,"'137 was nevertheless unintelligible to laypersons,
such as jurors. Only those who have "devoted years to its study" could
understand it; "[n] o other persons are competent judges of it."'1 8 Levy
proceeded to instruct the jury that the fair and neutral common law
said precisely and unequivocally what the prosecutors alleged it said.
Levy charged that the English per se rule of labour conspiracy -
that the mere desire of combining workers to raise their wages was
criminal - was the law, despite the lack of American precedent, the
shakiness of English precedent and the arguments of the defence that it
was not the American rule, nor ought it to be. Moreover, all of this was
to be blindly accepted as law by the jury:
If the rule be clear, we are bound to conform to it even though we do not com-
prehend the principle upon which it is founded. We are not to reject it because
we do not see the reason of it. It is enough, that it is the will of the major-
ity .... [I]f it is law, there may be good reasons for it though we cannot find
them out.139
Levy quickly found "good reasons" for the English rule - its abil-
ity to divide and terrorize workers, and thus to smash costly labour
protests.
The reason may be this .... In the turn-out of last fall, if each member of the
body had stood alone, fettered by no promises to the rest, many of them might
have changed their opinion as to the price of wages and gone to work; but...
they were bound down by their agreement, and pledged any mutual engage-
13' Id. at 226.
135 Id. at 225.
16 Id. at 232.
137 Id. at 225 (emphasis added).
128 Id. at 232; see also Pittsburgh Cordwainers at 80.
139 Philadelphia Cordwainers at 233. Levy then cited as controlling authority the treatise he
had twice asked Rodney to explain, without adverting to any of Rodney's several distinctions and
arguments, or even to the possibility that its authority might be questioned (see text accompany-
ing supra note 127).
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ments, to persist in it, however, contrary to their own judgment. The continuance
in improper conduct may therefore well be attributed to the combination. The
good sense of those individuals was prevented by this agreement, from having its
free exercise. 140
Like many of his successors on the bench in labour conspiracy cases,
Levy defined the conduct of the strikers to be "improper". Those who
wished to continue to strike were acting contrary to the (paternalisti-
cally defined) good of the community; there was no question about the
illegality of their action. Recorder Levy was unable to view either the
law or the facts from the defendants' standpoint; their activity was
completely unacceptable. The masters, the community and the law
were essentially the same thing in his mind.
For Levy, it was unnatural for workers to organize to demand
higher wages. "The usual means by which the prices of work are regu-
lated," he postulated, "are the demand for the article and the excel-
lence of the fabric. . . Much will depend, too, upon. . . whether the
materials are plenty or scarce . .. - Ignoring the degree of partial-
ity and artificiality in masters' establishing prices, and prefiguring an
argument which most of his successors would also rely upon, Levy
found the workers' attempts "an artificial regulation. . . dependent on
the will of the few who are interested; this is the unnatural way of
raising the price of goods or work." 142 Rodney's laissez-faire argument
that workers were also a natural part of the market, and that they com-
bined naturally to offset the power of masters, was ignored. The em-
ployers' view defined what was "normal". The parade of horribles,
which Levy thought would flow from allowing the workers to unite, was
explicitly and solely concocted from an elitist standpoint.
Is there any man who can calculate (if this is tolerated) at what price he may
safely contract to deliver articles, for which he may receive orders, if he is to be
regulated by the journeymen in an arbitrary jump from one price to another?
. . . It exposes [the commerce of the city] to inconveniences, if not to ruin;
therefore, it is against the public welfare. 143
Levy paternalistically noted that jours who opposed strikes and who
had families to maintain would be hurt too. He ignored the needs and
interests of striking workers and the economic and social reasons which
produced strikes.
The root of the difficulty, for Levy and for succeeding judges, was
loss of social control. Completely unperturbed about the workers' com-
140 Id. at 234.
141 Id. at 228.
242 Id. (emphasis added).
143 Id. at 229.
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plaint that the masters were taking away their privileges, freedom and
"living", Levy thought that the workers' potentially threatened the in-
dependence of the community. "[W]e shall have, besides our state leg-
islature a new legislature consisting of journeymen shoemakers. 144
Levy had crossed that dividing line between public and private (suppos-
edly the central boundary in liberal political thought), but had con-
fused the attempt by the jours to exert economic power with an at-
tempt by the masses to capture political power. As well, he feared their
success.
The merging of the judge and the law with one of the two sides in
the controversy was complete; the fairness of the law, not only despite
but also because of Recorder Levy's protestations to the contrary, had
disappeared. His was more blatant and stark than would be the opin-
ions in succeeding cases; the later judges found mellower and more ac-
ceptable legal language to express an economic bias and class identifi-
cation, although they may not have been fully "conscious" of it.145
Levy's pronouncements, nevertheless, set the tone and the pattern. The
result was a major problem for the rule of law in a supposed democ-
racy. He was determined that the working class should not become
"the governors of the community. ' 146 Yet in a democracy they were
supposed to have that chance, which was neither to be overtly impeded
or denied by the law.
C. The Pennsylvania Cases, 1815-1836
Presiding Judge Roberts echoed most of Levy's sentiments nine
years later in the Pittsburgh Cordwainers case. He had no trouble ac-
cepting the prosecution's view of the applicable law, since he found the
English statutes declaratory of, and actually having weakened a com-
mon law of labour conspiracy. 47 Moreover, he warned the jury not to
see the case as a class battle between poor jours and
employers, some of whom are represented as wealthy. . . [T]he attention of the
jury is invariably drawn to this point; as if the true question were whether the
journeymen were the oppressed, and the masters the oppressors - whether the
profits of the one class be not too great, and the remuneration of the other
inadequate.1 48
The defendants had not been indicted for attempting to raise their
144 Id. at 235.
141 See infra note 268.
" Philadelphia Cordwainers at 235.
147 Pittsburgh Cordwainers at 77-79.
118 Id. at 81.
1984]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
wages, Roberts noted. (This apparently was an attempt by the prosecu-
tor to avoid the outrage and consternation with which the working class
had greeted Levy's blunt legal ruling.) Rather, the crime charged was
raising a combination "unlawful or prejudicial to the community."1""
Such a retreat into the very legalistic vagueness and doubletalk which
Roberts said did not characterize the common law, was an attempt to
mask the fact that the per se conspiracy rule of Philadelphia Cord-
wainers really had not changed, either in terms of the proof adduced or
in terms of the judge's attitude toward the law and the defendants. If
the jours exerted any economic power by acting in concert - if they
went on strike to obtain those wages, for example, or enforced their
anti-scab rules to maintain wages - they acted illegally. ' ° Roberts
viewed such matters from the standpoint of the master, identifying the
master's needs with those of the whole community, ignoring the inter-
ests and claims of the union. It was "prejudicial to the community," he
ruled, for a labour organization to "menace" an employer with threats
of "the total destruction of his trade, and the means of subsistence," 151
but apparently it was not prejudicial for masters to threaten workers
with ever-lessening income and loss of power over their trade. Only one
sort of economic power was illegal. 152
Or was it? Roberts claimed that he would enforce freedom neu-
trally: "Such combinations, whether formed by master workmen, by
journeymen, or others, are unlawful and impolitic. 15 3 Ignoring social
and economic facts - the heavy cost of supporting a prosecution, and
the difficulty of obtaining indictments from any prosecutorial agencies
which shared his own bias - Roberts asserted that the law would pun-
ish masters who conspired against free enterprise, if only such a case
119 Id. at 77; see also id. at 81.
150 Id. at 81, 83-86.
Confederacies of this kind have a most pernicious effect, as respects the community at
large. They restrain trade: they tend to banish many artizans [sic], and to oppress others.
It is the interest of the public, and the right of every individual, that those who arc skilled
in any profession, art, or mystery, should be unrestrained in the exercise of it. . . .With-
out it, trade and manufacture cannot flourish ...
(Id. at 81).
151 Id. at 83.
158 The reporter of the decision certainly saw the ruling as intentionally and usefully anti-
labour:
The verdict of [the] jury is most important to the manufacturing interests of the commu-
nity; it puts an end to those associations which have been so prejudicial to the successful
enterprize [sic] of the capitalists of the western count[r]y . . . [M]anufacturers . . . are
bound by their interests as well as the duties they owe to the community, to. . . prosecute
to conviction . . . conspiracies so subversive to the best interests of their country.
(Id. at 16-17).
153 Id. at 82.
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would appear. Of course, only jours had been prosecuted.
Apparently, some workers decided to take the law up on its claim
of neutrality; for twelve years later, the next case in Pennsylvania was
founded upon an information against an alleged conspiracy of Philadel-
phia master shoemakers. Significantly, it was the only conspiracy pros-
ecution successfully brought against employers by workers in the
United States during the period 1805-1842 (or at any time, so far as I
have been able to determine). Although it had the effect of softening
Pennsylvania's harsh rules, the results only seemed fairer. A pattern
was emerging which Shaw's opinion in Hunt would replicate for the
whole field of labour conspiracy law.
After the masters were jailed on the information, their petition for
habeas corpus was heard by Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Gib-
son, sitting at a special trial court.115 The -masters admitted that they
"had agreed with each other not to employ any journeyman who would
not consent to work at reduced wages." 155 It was now the masters who
raised the legal defences and arguments which, in all the other cases,
had been or were to be made by the jours. This time the court, interest-
ingly enough, began to listen. The blunt per se ruling in Philadelphia
Cordwainers suddenly became obscure ("there was no general principle
distinctly asserted" in that case, Gibson said) and was to be limited "to
its particular circumstances" which mysteriously (and unexplainedly)
"materially differed" from those Gibson faced. 158 Unlike the clarity
which Levy and Roberts had found, the common law of conspiracy was
"unsettled" to Gibson; and where it had been extended to cover lawful
acts performed by lawful means (as in labour conspiracy cases), it "in-
stantly involved . . distinctions as complicated and as various as the
relations and transactions of civil society."157 Agreeing with arguments
previously ignored, Gibson felt that it might be dangerous to import
British policies directed against artisans, and concluded that if combi-
nation alone were held to be criminal, "it would necessarily impart a
criminality to the most laudable associations."15
This new-found appearance of fairness, however, did not enable
Gibson to formulate a clearer definition of what conduct had to be
added to a combination to make it illegal. His statement of the rule
154 Commonwealth v. Carlisle, Brightly (1821) at 36. An information would have to have
been laid by citizens, not by a prosecutor. Habeas corpus allows the reviewing judge to test the
legality of a detention, and is heard summarily and expeditiously.
115 Id. at 36.
I" Id. at 37.
157 Id. at 38.
158 Id. at 39.
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was essentially in the vague per se language used by Roberts: combina-
tion became criminal "where there is direct intention that injury shall
result from it .. . [or] wherever the act to be done has a necessary
tendency to prejudice the public or to oppress individuals by unjustly
subjecting them to the power of the confederates." 159 This language
settles nothing. What sort of injury would be actionable? What would
count as oppressive or prejudicial? What is unjust? Common law
courts would, of course, make such decisions, and they would continue
to do so within the parameters of what they considered to be "normal".
Gibson adopted an individualistic market view of what was natural
and usual, in which capitalism was exempted from any conspiracy test:
[T]he increase of power by combination of means ...may be ... not only
oppressive to individuals, but mischievous to the public at large. . . .The combi-
nation of capital for purposes of commerce . . . although it may in its conse-
quences indirectly operate on third persons, is unaffected by this consideration,
because it is a common means in the ordinary course of human affairs, which
stimulates to competition and enables men to engage in undertakings too weighty
for an individual. 160
Combination of either labour or bosses was "artificial" and thus "crim-
inal when its object is to depress the price of labour below what it
would bring, if it were left . . to take its chance in the market. ' 'lt
Gibson carried his notions to their logical conclusion, but intro-
duced the novel and potentially dangerous notion of causation. He
ruled that since competition itself was not an illegal combination, the
only acceptable defence for the indicted masters would be for them to
demonstrate that the object of their combination was "to foil their an-
tagonists in an attempt to assign to it [labour], by surreptitious means,
a value which it would not otherwise have.116 2 The masters would have
to demonstrate that they were attempting to defend themselves against
a prior conspiracy by the workers. Gibson apologized to the masters for
such an evenhanded rendition of legal principles, but assured them that
it would in fact work to their benefit:
As I was necessarily led into an examination of principles that might have an
unfavourable operation on the relators [masters], I owed it to them, particularly
as there was some evidence of combination on the part of the journeymen who
prosecute, to state also those principles that may possibly operate in their fa-
259 Id. at 39, 40.
160 Id. at 41.
161 Id. at 42. Gibson accepted the argument (also to be accepted by Shaw) that combinations
of labour would eventually force employers to accept reasonable wages, and thus he understood
the market in terms of groups and not, as did many of his contemporaries (as shall be seen in the
subsequent Pennsylvania casei) as a matter of competition between individuals (see id. at 41).
182 Id. at 42.
[VOL. 22, No. 4
Labour Conspiracy
your. ... 163
The law of labour conspiracy in Pennsylvania had been made to
appear more fair and evenhanded, though what its development might
have been had the people in jail not been respectable masters is un-
known. In other states, reference to a pre-existing confederacy of mas-
ters, causing a combination on the part of the workers, was not even
admissible,16' much less a complete defence for an indicted union.
However, the effects of Judge Gibson's supposed even-handedness were
all one-sided. The master shoemakers in the case before him presuma-
bly raised their now-valid defence and escaped criminal liability. No
more prosecutions were brought against masters, as the sudden "fair-
ness" exhibited by the courts in addition to the economic difficulties of
going to court may have discouraged workers, whose economic position
was deteriorating. No other jurisdiction adopted Judge Gibson's rule,
and there is no case in Pennsylvania where a union successfully raised
the defence of a prior employer conspiracy.16 5 This was probably be-
cause Gibson had left a giant loophole: he ruled that combinations
which "intended to coerce not only the employers but also third per-
sons," were still illegal (unless, of course, such coercion was the indi-
rect effect of a combination of capital).,6 6
While it was neither followed nor widely cited outside Pennsylva-
nia, Gibson's decision established the parameters of the three subse-
quent conspiracy cases within that jurisdiction. Each of the three cases
fit within the loophole Gibson had left, since each involved a conspiracy
indictment of a union for attempting to influence non-union journey-
men through boycott or exhortation. In each of the cases the judges
ruled that such activity was illegal.167 However, in the final case, in the
National Trades Union summer of 1836,16" the jury refused to follow
the direction of the court and returned a not guilty verdict.
The three judges made it clear that they disfavoured labour orga-
nizations. In the mildest of the three opinions, Recorder Reed in 1827
163 Id. at 43.
1" See text accompanying infra notes 173, 179, 202. One of these cases, New York Cord-
wainers, antedated Carlisle and was known to Gibson when he wrote his opinion: see Table II in
the Appendix, infra. Gibson did not note its contrary ruling on this point.
163 Thus, we will never know whether any journeymen would have been allowed to show that
the origins of a dialectic of combination and counter-combination lay in an original combination
of masters, or in the amassing of capital.
186 Carlisle at 36, 42.
167 See Philadelphia Tailors at 258-60; Philadelphia Spinners at 267; Philadelphia Plaster-
ers at 336.
168 See supra note 78 and infra note 172 and accompanying text; Mittelman, supra note 78,
at 395-412, 424-37, 442-44.
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denounced the admittedly legal activities of the union (striking in retal-
iation against the employers) as "the height of folly and impru-
dence. 11 69 In reviewing the testimony on "the most important charge,
and by far the most exceptionable and illegal part of the defendants'
conduct," that is the count indicting the workers for attempting to in-
fluence others, Reed's language left no doubt where he stood:
To suffer young unmarried men, as the defendants or some of them probably are,
unrestrained by the care of a family, . . . at the head of their professions, who
can come and go, and command the highest wages, to tyrannise over and oppress
others with families and less ability to support them, cannot have the semblance
of law or reason . . . . [C]ases of individual suffering frequently occur which
considered as a public offense, ought not to pass unredressed and unpunished.
The old and infirm would be placed in the power of the young and healthy; the
one might be enjoying comforts, and even his pleasures, while the other could
scarcely give bread to his family.17 0
This partial view of the suffering which occurs during a strike or
boycott - from the standpoint of those not in the union - is also
evident in the little which is reported of Presiding Judge King's state-
ment in the 1829 Philadelphia Spinners case.17 1 Similarly, Recorder
Bouvier, in his grand jury charge in the Philadelphia Plasterers case in
1836, focused on the "arbitrary" and "extravagant" nature of the jour-
neymen's wage demands rather than upon either the needs of the work-
ers or the sufficiency of any wage offer by the bosses. Characteristi-
cally, he fourld such a combination "at variance with the principles of
free exertion, free use of capital, and free competition . . . [which]
blasts individual exertions, which are the very soul of trade."17 2
169 Philadelphia Tailors at 252.
170 Id. at 258-59.
171 Philadelphia Spinners at 267-68 (the court believed the testimony of all of the prosecu-
tion witnesses, but discounted the testimony of all of the witnesses for the defence, most of whom
were unemployed cotton spinners).
'72 Philadelphia Plasterers at 336-37. It must be conceded that Recorder Bouvier gave the
most realistic description of the economic dominance of the masters (who were not indicted, of
course) that appears in a judicial statement in any of the conspiracy cases of the 1805-1842 pc-
riod. Since there were fewer masters than jours, he noted that their agreements were
only more easily made, and more easily enforced; and while their wealth enables them to
wait the effect of their combination, the poverty of those against whom it is directed,
obliges them, generally, soon to yield to the dictates of the employer, be they ever so
oppressive.
(Id. at 337). The Recorder delivered himself of these sparse remarks, however, soon after a fright-
ening, tremendous labour protest in New York City against recent anti-labour conspiracy deci-
sions of Judges Savage and Edwards (discussed in the next subsection) at which both judges had
been burned in effigy. The protest occurred during the height of the National Trades Union move-
ment in 1836, when labour power in eastern cities was to some surprisingly evident and when
caution was judicious (see Mittelman, supra note 78, at 409-11). As noted in the text accompany-
ing supra note 168, the plasterers were acquitted by the jury.
Interestingly, Laurie's thorough and stirring account of the General Trades Union of Phila-
delphia of 1834-1838 (especially including the first general strike in the United States in 1835)
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Restrained in his expression of distaste for labour organization by
Gibson's opinion in Carlisle, each Pennsylvania judge was able never-
theless to get across his anti-labour feelings to the jury. The Pennsylva-
nia law of labour conspiracy appeared to be more fair than the law in
the earliest cases or the law in other states, and it anticipated the her-
alded fairness (and legal theory) of Shaw in Hunt; this ensued from the
lone indictment of masters in the 1805-1842 period, and the resulting
stress placed on one-sided doctrine.
D. The New York Cases, 1809-1836
The labour conspiracy jurisprudence of New York presents an in-
structive contrast to that in Pennsylvania. No indictments of masters
were obtained in New York, and opinions there throughout the period
retained much of the flavour of the Philadelphia Cordwainers decision.
In the face of arguably ameliorative action by the legislature, the
judges construed the new conspiracy statute as adopting their own ex-
isting per se rule.
Mayor Radcliff's preliminary rulings in the 1809 New York Cord-
wainers case established a distinctly anti-labour pattern. The shoemak-
ers proffered evidence to sustain three defences: (i) their combination
was only retaliatory because of a prior confederacy of the masters; (ii)
their wage demands were reasonable; and (iii) the masters were mak-
ing excessive profits. Radcliff refused to accept any of this evidence,
ruling it irrelevant.173 That effectively cut off the shoemakers' strike
from its real-world context and indicated an acceptance of a doctrine of
per se conspiracy in New York. During a long day of prosecution testi-
mony, punctuated by wearying legal arguments about the evidence,
Mayor Radcliff harassed the workers when he ruled "that [he] would
sit till twelve o'clock, rather than adjourn," 17' forcing the defendants to
make their arguments to the jury quite late that night.
William Sampson, the workers' lawyer, saw the handwriting on
the wall, observing to the court "that the difficulties under which he
laboured, were beyond his force, and that he was conscious [that] en-
tering upon an argument of such a nature, under such disadvantages
was a forlorn endeavour. 17 5 Sampson did not give up, however, and
urged the jury to disregard any bias, they might have detected in the
judge:
fails to mention the Plasterers case (Laurie, supra note 54, at 87-104).
Ila New York Cordwainers at 371-72.
274 Id. at 372.
178 Id. at 372-73. It must be noted that Sampson himself was the reporter in this case.
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The single question would be [he reports himself as having argued] . . . whether
the law of England was to govern this case. He was aware how far the doctrines
of the English law upon this head, had unfortunately given a bias to the judg-
ment of many individuals; and no doubt, some of those whom chance had ar-
rayed to sit in judgment on this case, must be presumed, however honourable and
intelligent, to have imbibed more or less of that opinion. The jury, it is true, are
judges of fact and law in criminal cases ... 176
Sampson predicted correctly. Radcliff instructed the jury that the
common law (minus what he chose to call its absurdities, which myste-
riously were no longer in force) applied to the case, and that the anti-
scab and boycott rules of the society "were arbitrary and unlawful"
under that common law of conspiracy. The absence of New York
precedents for him to cite was due (he alleged) to the failure to pre-
serve the records of prior conspiracy convictions. 1" The economic cir-
cumstances and Sampson's argument that the policy behind the Eng-
lish law of conspiracy was discrimination against workers were
completely ignored. After the jury had dutifully pronounced the defen-
dants guilty, the judge paternalistically assured the workers
[t]hat they had equal rights with all other members of the community was un-
doubted, and they had also the right to meet and regulate their concerns, and to
ask for wages, and to work or refuse; but that the means they used, were of a
nature too arbitrary and coercive, and which went to deprive their fellow-citizens
of rights as precious as any they contended for.17 8
Therefore, strikes, boycotts or any effective means of exerting their
"equal rights" would be illegal.
Twelve years later, Judge Riker followed suit in the New York
Hatters case. He disallowed defendants' evidence "offered to prove a
conspiracy among tfie master hatters not to employ any journeymen
who left his last place on account of wages, in order to prove that the
meeting of the journeymen hatters was for a lawful purpose," 179 despite
the fact that, two years earlier in Pennsylvania, Justice Gibson had
ruled that a conspiracy was a justifiable defence to another conspir-
acy.180 In his short jury charge, Riker accepted all of the prosecution's
views on the law, including the inapplicability of an unreported case
where a New York court had apparently allowed a combination of gro-
cers and hardware merchants to refuse to purchase from auctioneers,
178 Id. at 373.
1 Id. at 383-84. Radcliff alluded to no specific trials whose records had been lost.
178 Id. at 385.
179 New York Hatters at 146.
180 See Carlisle at 42, discussed in text accompanying supra note 162-63. It must be added
that Carlisle was not cited in New York Hatters, and Gibson's ruling may not have been available
to Riker.
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since that boycott "was, or was supposed to be, for the general advan-
tage of the community."'' The workers' confederacy, a boycott over
the hiring of a jour who worked for less than the agreed wages, was
held to be not for the common good since "the object of the conspiracy
[before the court] was directed to the prosecutor alone."' '82
The New York legislature elaborated upon its statutory definition
of conspiracy in 1829. In abrogating the common law, the amended
statute expressly restricted conspiracy indictments to those instances
falling within its language. 183 The legislature rejected a provision which
would have made criminal a conspiracy "to defraud or injure any per-
son in his trade or business". T This could have been taken as an indi-
cation of legislative intent to abolish the per se labour conspiracy rule.
However, language was included which criminalized conspiracies "inju-
rious to the public health, to public morals, or to trade or commerce."
This vague standard was probably used with the intent to leave it open
to the courts to decide whether labour organizations or their activities
were injurious to trade or commerce. 85 Three cases arose in the mid-
1830s in which the question could be answered.
Shoemakers in Geneva, New York, were indicted in 1834 on facts
similar to those in the Hatters case: the formation of a union to raise
wages and the execution of a boycott against an employer who paid
lower than union rates to one of his jours. The indictment was dis-
missed by the trial court on grounds that the facts alleged did not fall
within the statute. Perhaps the judge concluded that the legislature had
intended to abolish per se conspiracy, or perhaps the judge believed
such strikes were not "injurious . . . to trade or commerce."'836
The district attorney appealed the dismissal to New York's Su-
preme Court of Judicature and won a reversal in 1835.87 Chief Justice
Savage made it clear that in his opinion the statute had not changed
the law in New York. A confederation to raise wages was, he decided,
per se a conspiracy at common law. Then, he queried rhetorically:
"journeymen bootmakers, by extravagant demands for wages, so en-
hance the price of boots made in Geneva, for instance, that boots made
elsewhere . . . can be sold cheaper, is not such an act injurious to
181 New York Hatters at 148-49.
182 Id. at 149.
18a See Geneva Shoemakers at 14.
18, See Hudson Shoemakers at 305-306 (quote at 306).
"5 See Geneva Shoemakers at 14.
186 Id.
187 Id.
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trade?"1 88 Once again, the interests of the employers had become the
"interests of society"18 9 while the interests of the union and the workers
were ignored. "Trade" and "commerce" were not sen from the em-
ployee's standpoint, and union organization itself was ruled to be
a monopoly of the worst kind. The journeymen mechanics might, by fixing
their own wages, regulate the prices of all manufactured articles, and the com-
munity would be enormously taxed .... Competition is the life of trade. If the
defendants cannot make coarse boots for less than $1 per pair, let them refuse to
do so; but let them not directly or indirectly undertake to say that others shall
not do the work for a less price.190
Worker organizations were "artificial". Savage understood that "the
wages of mechanics will be regulated by the demand for the manufac-
tured article, and the value of that which is paid for it,"191 but failed to
see that the journeymen shoemakers of Geneva were attempting to be
intimately involved in establishing the "demand for" and the "value of"
their own "article" - their labour.
The next year the journeymen tailors of New York City struck to
raise wages and to enforce other work rules, including a full-employ-
ment rule (that is, no jour would get a second job until each jour had
been offered one). They were indicted for conspiracy after a long and
bitter turn-out. Judge Edwards echoed the fiercely anti-labour senti-
ments of Recorder Levy in his charge to the jury and in his speech
delivered upon sentencing. Edwards charged the jury "against all such
lawless combinations, as violations of law, destructive of the rights of
employers, and others not associated, who were employed; detrimental
to the public interests generally, and injurious to trade and commerce."
He thought the charges were "fully sustained by the evidence . ..
[and] ...spoke in very strong terms against all combinations."19' 2
In the midst of labour's muscle flexing in 1836,183 the judge was
worried that the jury would "turn its back upon the Supreme Court
[Savage's opinion] and say that an offence was lawful which they de-
clared to be illegal.1 94 The court instructed that "the prisoners were
indubitably guilty"195 and concluded that
it was impossible that the acts of the defendants could escape with impunity
18 Id: at 15, 18 (quote at 18).
189 Id. at 18.
190 Id. at 19.
191 Id at 18 (comma omitted).
122 New York Tailors at 317-18.
193 See supra note 172 and text accompanying supra notes 78, 172.
194 New York Tailors at 322.
295 Id. at 324.
[VOL. 22, No. 4
Labour Conspiracy
unless the court and the jury violate their duty in order to take them out of the
operation of law. . . .[TIhe present question was not to be considered a mere
struggle between the masters and journeymen. It was one upon which the har-
mony of the whole community depended. Let these societies only arise from time
to time and they would at last extend to every trade in this city and we should
have as many governments as there were societies.1 96
Upon sentencing, during a lengthy peroration against labour un-
ions, Edwards reminded the jury (ironically) that "every American
knows, or ought to know, that he has no better friend than the laws,
and that he needs no artificial combination for his protection."'197 The
judge felt at a loss "to know what degree of severity may be necessary
to rid society of them [unions],"19" so he imposed what he chose to call
"very mild" fines totalling the stupendous sum of $1150 (although
Levy, for example, had imposed fines of $8 each), ordering each defen-
dant "to stand committed until paid. . . .The different individuals im-
mediately ...paid their fine, and were discharged."'' 99
Union organization in 1836 was at a high point; though a protest
failed to materialize at the time of the tailors' sentencing, 00 a week
later a crowd of more than 25,000 people gathered. Among other
things, they burned Judges Savage and Edwards in effigy and called for
the formation of a workingman's party to counteract the political
power of the employers. 20' Meanwhile, a conspiracy trial of journey-
men shoemakers in Hudson, New York, was coming to a close. There,
Judge Wilcoxson refused to accept defendants' proffered evidence
showing the masters conspiring to reduce wages in winter to a level so
low that workers would have been unable to live.20 2 His view of the
evidence and the judge's charge reflected the masters' viewpoint to the
same extent as in the other New York cases. Wilcoxson's tone was
much more constrained and even-tempered, 03 probably due to the con-
temporaneous labour uprising in New York City against the unfairness
of the labour conspiracy doctrine. Interestingly, the jury acquitted the
defendants. 0 4
196 Id.
197 Id. at 330-31.
198 Id. at 332.
199 Id. "While the defendants were paying their fines, a worker in the courtroom stepped up
and handed over his wages to the fund. Later, unions in other cities sent contributions to the
tailors" (Foner, supra note 3, at 155).
200 New York Tailors at 325-26.
201 See Mittelman, supra note 78, at 410-11, 462-64; Foner, supra note 3, at 155-62, 167-68.
202 Hudson Shoemakers at 283.
203 See id. at 310-12.
204 It was the first such acquittal (in a criminal case where enough of the judge's opinion is
reported to know his bias), but was soon to be followed by another jury acquittal in the Philadel-
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A committee report to the March 1836 convention of the National
Society of Cordwainers gave a clear indication of the workers' cogni-
zance of the bias contained in these conspiracy decisions:
The judge [Savage] has forgot ... the conspiracies and the combinations of the
rich against the poor .... The only difference is that the poor have not the
means nor the power to prosecute successfully those pirates upon the products of
labor.20
5
The one-sidedness of the law was emphasized again when the New
York City grand jury refused to indict the master tailors for conspiracy
upon a bill of charges presented by the already-indicted journeymen,
despite the language of apparent fairness in the law.206 The courts and
the law remained staunchly and overtly on the side of the employers: in
a period of widespread labour organization such as the mid-1830s,
massive labour protest (terminated only by the Panic of 1837)207 was
one of the results.208
E. Commonwealth v. Hunt at the Trial Level
Judge Peter Oxenbridge Thacher, who sat at the trial of the Bos-
ton bootmakers, had already become known among Boston labourers as
an anti-labour judge. 20 9 He did not change his stripes during the trial;
his bias was visible even though he wrote the report of the case. He
opined that those authorities which had found a criminal conspiracy in
a labour organization intent upon establishing a rate of wages "have
phia Plasterers case (see supra note 172; Foner, supra note 3, at 157).
200 "Proceedings of the Convention of Cordwainers Holden in the City of New York in
March 1836," quoted in Nelles, supra note 112, at 1160n. (a pamphlet found in the Hunt file in
Rantoul's papers).
20 Mittelman, supra note 78, at 409.
210 The importance of the catastrophic Panic of 1837 in stifling and smashing the already
marginal ability of unions to maintain strength and organization is emphasized in Laurie, supra
note 54, at 103-33.
208 The only conspiracy incident emanating from Connecticut during the period under study
is unique in several ways and will be treated in a footnote rather than in the text. It was a civil
case, a suit for damages; it was brought not by masters but by a corporate employer; it concerned
events in a small company town; it did not involve workers who made apparel; and there were
three trials of the issue, none of which eventuated in the employer's favour. The third trial, pre-
sided over by the state's Chief Justice Williams for unknown reasons, is the one we have a report
of. While the record lacks the heat and fervour exhibited in the other conspiracy trials, Williams'
bias was demonstrated by his rulings (1) that a continuing conspiracy (as alleged by plaintiffs)
need not have actually been proved (he held that only a single day's existence of the conspiracy
needed to be shown), and (2) that the evidence presented tended to show that a conspiracy existed
on that day (see Thompsonville Carpet Weavers at 114-15). The workers admitted to having
combined to set wages, which Williams ruled legal, but to conspire to interrupt and destroy the
plaintiff's business (which means to attempt to put their wage combinations into effect) Williams
found to be illegal (id. at 115). The jury found for the workers.
"oI See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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always been held in great respect. '210 He did not have to decide the
applicability of the blatant anti-union per se rule, since the prosecution
(unlike almost all others previously discussed here) 21 concerned not
wages, but only the operation of union rules amounting to a closed
shop. He used this distinction as an excuse to prevent the workers from
introducing evidence of current prices in order to demonstrate how
much they needed to protect themselves from employers who would not
accept union standards. 1 2 However, Thacher later recognized a con-
nection between wages, prices and the closed shop from the employers'
point of view, when he instructed the jury to "judge, whether they [the
workers] do not propose . . . to compel the people of the common-
wealth to pay for their boots and shoes whatever price this society shall
set."'213 He smoothed the way for conviction by ruling that combination
itself, without any overt act in furtherance thereof, would be sufficient
to constitute conspiracy. 1 4 He commented, prejudicially, that the
workers had not produced their constitution because to have done so
would probably have damaged their cause.215
The workers introduced evidence that their union had raised the
moral standards of workers and had improved the quality of ,work.
They also found masters (among others) willing to testify that the
union had neither impoverished the bosses nor oppressed non-member
jours. 216 Thacher ignored this evidence, given his single-minded identi-
fication of the employers' interests with those of the community. He
instructed the jury (contrary to the law) that the judge was to be the
210 Hunt at 638.
21 The 1809 Baltimore shoemakers' strike, and the resulting conspiracy trial, concerned a
closed-shop issue (see Steffen, supra note 54, at 222).
212 Hunt at 638. The case did not arise from a strike. Indeed, during the period after the
Panic of 1837 labour was quiescent in Boston as elsewhere, and labour-management relations
were relatively peaceful; the bosses clearly held the upper hand when times were tough. The Hunt
prosecution occurred not through labour strife, but because of the zeal of the prosecutor (a dis-
gruntled employee, Jeremiah Home) and Boston's anti-labour District Attorney Samuel D. Parker
(see Nelles, supra note 112, at 1131-33).
213 Hunt at 647. Nelles notes that Thacher's permission (given despite the objection of the
workers' attorney Rantoul) that employers might state their conclusions as to the coerciveness of
the union's rules was prejudicial to the workers (Nelles, supra note 112, at 1137-38). The boot-
makers claimed on appeal that Thacher's evidentiary rulings erred both on this point and on the
exclusion of evidence of economic conditions, but Chief Justice Shaw found it unnecessary to
decide these questions (id. at 1147n.).
214 Hunt at 641.
216 Id. at 646.
218 Id. at 619-20. Interestingly, the workers also tried to demonstrate that the local bar asso-
ciation had a rule which read precisely like their purportedly illegal closed-shop requirement (id.
at 620-21). Thacher was of the opinion that the bar's rule "was evidently beneficial to the commu-
nity . . . and has tended, without doubt, greatly to elevate the members of the profession in the
confidence and esteem of their fellow-citizens" (id. at 652).
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sole source of applicable law. Further, he thundered that a rejection of
his charge "may ... do an act of injustice to the whole commu-
nity. ' 217 Thacher then attempted to deflect the jury's attention from
the economic and social facts:
The question is not whether the society [that is, the union] have used their power
to the extent of mischief of which it is capable, but rather, whether they have not
assumed a power not derived from the law, but repugnant to it, which in the
hands of irresponsible persons, is liable to great abuse. . . .Let them use their
liberty freely, but carefully abstain from infringing the rights of others.218
Any doubts about the judge's position would have been dispelled by his
closing attack, which echoed the entrepreneurial ethos of Levy, Savage
and Edwards in adopting a new per se rule:
I am of opinion, and it is my duty to instruct you, as a matter of law, that this
society of journeymen bootmakers ...is an unlawful conspiracy against the
laws of this commonwealth. It is a new power in the state, unknown to its consti-
tution and laws, and subversive of their equal spirit [sic!]. If such associations
should be organized and carried into operation through the varying grades, pro-
fessions and pursuits of the people of this commonwealth, all industry and enter-
prise would be suspended, and all property would become insecure. It would in-
volve in one common fatal ruin both laborer and employer, and the rich as well
as the poor. It would tend directly to array them against each other, and to
convulse the social system to its centre. Nothing but the force of government can
put down a general spirit of misrule.219
The jury had no alternative but to deliver a guilty verdict in order to
"put down" an attempt by "irresponsible persons" to gain social con-
trol, to stop social revolution, to save the property, commerce and "lib-
erty" of the commonwealth from "misrule"; in short, to prevent class
warfare.
Labour law had returned to the openly pro-employer position
taken by Levy in 1806, not that the intervening rulings in labour con-
spiracy cases had much strengthened the foundations of fairness upon
which the Rule of Law presumably rests. On the appeal of Hunt, it
became the task of one of the nineteenth-century's most brilliant com-
mon law judges and propounders of laissez-faire law, Massachusetts'
Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw, to solve this ideologically crucial paradox.
IV. CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW, THE WORKERS AND THE
RULE OF LAW
[Chief Justice] Shaw [in Commonwealth v. Hunt] was sufficiently objective to
217 Id. at 640.
228 id. at 650-51.
'19 Id. at 653-54.
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take into account what any realist must understand, that in the normal relations
between employers and employees, bargaining inevitably involves restraints and
pressures of a sort, as did competition itself, the force which all respectable men
believed responsible for progress in industry. . . . In so doing, he reconciled the
standing law with the needs of a free society.220
A. The Puzzle of Hunt
Shaw's seemingly pro-labour opinion in Hunt has puzzled many
perceptive writers.221 How could this bastion of banking and invest-
ment, this staid Boston High Federalist, this epitome of entrepreneurial
sentiment,222 bring himself even partially to favour the very workers
who, one week before the decision in Hunt was announced, had been
severely damaged by his own anti-labour ruling in Farwell v. Boston
and Worcester Railroad Company?223  Moreover, Shaw's words in
220 Levy, supra note 15, at 188, 190-91.
221 "Commonwealth v. Hunt [was] a seeming victory of Jeffersonianism in a Tory State and
in a court dominated by the great but far from Jeffersonian Chief Justice Shaw." Neles, supra
note 112, at 1130; see also, e.g., Levy, supra note 15, at 192. See generally Turner, supra note 12,
at 58-65.
222 Richard Henry Dana described Shaw as "a man of intense and doting biases in religious,
political, and social matters." [Chase, Lemuel Shaw (1918) at 216) quoted in Nelles, supra note
112, at 1152]. "The constituency to which his sense of obligation was keenest comprised State
Street and Beacon Hill, the bankers, the textile-manufacturers, the railway builders" (id.). For
Shaw's political, economic and social background and outlook, see generally Levy, supra note 15,
at 9-18, 27; Nelles, supra note 112, at 1152-54. For particular evidence of Shaw's entrepreneurial
and pro-business attitudes in his judicial decisions, see Levy, supra note 15, at 118-82.
223 45 Mass. (4 Metc.) 49 (1842). Shaw's most recent biographer who, in explicating Shaw's
opinions, "proceed[ed] from the assumption that [Shaw] expounded and configured the common
law conscientiously, to the best of his understanding and without overt bias". Levy, supra note 15,
at 178, explains the meaning and impact of Farwell as follows:
Stripped of qualifications, the [fellow-servant] rule [in the Farwell case] was that a ser-
vant, or employee, injured through no fault of his own by the negligence of a fellow ser-
vant, could not maintain a claim for damages against his master, or employer. By this rule
American capitalism, at a critical stage of its development, was relieved of an enormous
financial burden for industrial accidents which it would otherwise have incurred. The losses
from injury on the job were sustained by the workers themselves. . . . [The case] was
tough on accident victims, particularly of the working class.
(Id. at 166, 182). For a recent treatment of the growth of the fellow servant rule remarkable
primarily as an exemplar of the need for scholars to adopt the kind of broad class analysis used in
this essay (so that there is an escape from the toils of the supposed dichotomy between overtly
instrumental decisions and those "motivated primarily by intellectual norms within the legal com-
munity"), see Comment, The Creation of a Common Law Rule: The Fellow Servant Rule, 1837-
1860 (1984), 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 579. A more useful approach to the same problem can be found
in Tucker, The Law of Employers' Liability in Ontario, 1861-1900: The Search for a Theory
(1984), 22 Osgoode Hall L. J. 211. Tucker's insistence upon base-superstructure distinctions, "rel-
ative autonomy" and other two-dimensional concepts closely tied to the false liberal-capitalist split
between subjectivity and objectivity tends to make his analysis too rigid, abstract and ahistorical.
Nevertheless, his emphasis on socio-economic interaction, on the contradictions fundamental to a
capitalist society, and on the primacy of the wage-labour contradiction; his insistence that "from a
Marxist perspective, it is impossible to treat legal development either as a simple reflection of
more fundamental forces, or as something that takes place independently of those forces" (id. at
275); in short, his presentation of a dialectical class analysis of the legal relations in society is a
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Hunt have achieved an apparently instant and long-lasting aura of
greatness, despite demonstration of their actual legal worthlessness.224
The apparent even-handedness in Hunt has been heralded as a para-
digm of judicial fairness in a time of legal uncertainty.
Perhaps the solution to the puzzle is reasonably simple - Shaw's
opinion was not really pro-labour. Shaw did not stray from his class
leanings, in intention, legal meaning or effect. Rather, he brilliantly
solved a problem of ideology and legitimacy in the time-honoured com-
mon law tradition, using supposedly neutral rules to make labour law
seem fair and evenhanded.
Shaw's opinion for a unanimous appellate court, delivered after
"considerable time ha[d] elapsed since the argument", 25 reversed
Thacher's decision. The indictment of the journeymen bootmakers was
ruled legally insufficient, because it did not set forth an allegation ei-
ther of an agreement to use illegal means, or of an agreement to use
legal means to reach unlawful ends. Shaw ruled that it was not unlaw-
ful for workers to agree "to induce all those engaged in the same occu-
pation to become members of" their union, nor was it unlawful for
them to agree "that they would not work for a person, who, after due
notice, should employ a journeyman not a member of their society. "220
Finally, it was not unlawful for the union to have as an object the im-
poverishment of Horne (the non-union jour the union wanted fired) be-
cause competition itself might impoverish someone, "and yet it is
through that competition, that the best interests of trade and industry
are promoted." 227 Whether the union engaged in criminal acts to im-
poverish, therefore, would "depend upon the means to be used," and
illegal means had not been alleged.228 The per se labour conspiracy
doctrine - embraced by Recorder Levy in the Philadelphia Cordwain-
ers case, by Chief Justice Savage and Judge Edwards in the relatively
recent Geneva Shoemakers and New York Tailors cases and by Judge
Thacher at trial in Hunt - was discarded by these words. In its place,
an amorphous ends-means test was adopted, which seemed to be fairer
and which acquitted the Boston bootmaker jours.
Praise for Shaw's effort has been extravagant. Walter Nelles felt
that Shaw's Hunt opinion essentially adopted all the legal positions
major advance.
22 See generally Turner, supra note 12, at 58-72. Compare the text accompanying infra
notes 230-52.
225 Hunt (on appeal) at 121.
226 Id. at 129, 130.
227 Id. at 134.
22 Id.
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contended for by Rantoul, especially the points that "special unlawful-
ness peculiar to labor organizations was not to be transplanted from
England, and . . . whatever one person may lawfully do, any number
may lawfully undertake, even if the result is to maintain the closed
shop. ' 229 Shaw's most recent biographer, Leonard Levy, went so far as
to place the fair-minded and beneficial Hunt decision close to the core
of his interpretation and evaluation of the man,230 calling it Shaw's
"best known and most widely praised opinion .. . [and] ... the
Magna Charta of American trade unionism, for it removed the stigma
of criminality from labor organizations."2 " The eminent American la-
bour historian, Richard Morris, termed the opinion a "forward-looking
. ..landmark" because it was founded upon the realization "that the
threat of criminal prosecutions had little or no effect upon strike activ-
ity. ' 232 An even more critical observer, James Landis, later Dean of the
Harvard Law School, who understood that "little in substantive legal
doctrine was contained in the opinion," concluded that "the case is still
outstanding" because of its awareness "of the growing demand for the
recognition of the legality of the common objectives of trade unions. '23 3
The value of the opinion seems more modest if scholarly legal
comment and case law over the seventy-five years after the decision is
assessed. An early compiler of judicial statements about labour unions
found in it "the first judicial appreciation of the possible good in labor
organizations. ' 234 A Massachusetts attorney in 1887 called it "one of
the most masterly" of Shaw's opinions, one which was cited only with
approval in subsequent Massachusetts cases.2 35 Another Massachusetts
attorney writing contemporaneously, however, surveyed the field of la-
bour conspiracy and called Hunt merely Massachusetts' "chief case",
finding little pre-eminence or extraordinariness in it.238 No other writer
"I Nelles, supra note 112, at 1148, 1151.
230 See Levy, supra note 15, at 323-25.
"' Id. at 183.
22 Morris, supra note 6, at xi.
233 Landis, supra note 15, at 33.
21, Groat, Attitudes of American Courts in Labor Cases (1911) at 50. A treatment of con-
spiracy law in the United States termed Hunt "well known" and said that it contained the most
common definition of conspiracy found in American cases [Carson, "The Law of Criminal Con-
spiracies and Agreements as Found in the American Cases," in Wright, ed., The Law of Criminal
Conspiracies and Agreements (1887) at 110-11, 157].
'5 Selfridge, American Law of Strikes and Boycotts as Crimes (1888), 22 Am. L. Rev. 233
at 237, 247. It will be seen, however, that at least one subsequent relevant Massachusetts case did
not cite Hunt at all (see text accompanying infra note 250). Selfridge did not cite any Massachu-
setts authority in support of his assertion.
236 Brigham, Strikes and Boycotts as Indictable Conspiracies at Common Law (1887), 22
Am. L. Rev. 41 at 66.
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gave the case any particular distinction, much less calling it a leading
case,237 and several ignored it completely.
Prosecutors and courts seemed to be even less aware of the signifi-
cance of Hunt. No labour conspiracy opinions have been discovered for
the post-Hunt decade (1842-1852). Three indictments were brought in
the next decade, despite Hunt, and at least twenty-five peppered the
labour-turbulent 1860s, 1870s and 1880s.238 The actual "leading case"
in these times was not Hunt, but proved to be an 1867 case from New
Jersey, State v. Donaldson,239 in which the workers were convicted of
conspiracy despite the fact "the conduct of the defendants. . . did not
differ from that of the indicted shoemakers in" Hunt2 40 Chief Justice
Beasley was able to "distinguish" Hunt facilely in Donaldson, because
the New Jersey indictment alleged what he determined to be an illegal
object of the union.241 Another important conspiracy decision of these
-years, Master Stevedores v. Walsh,2 42 misread Hunt as standing for
the proposition that labour organizations (here, masters) could legally
coerce their own members but were barred from attempting to coerce
those who had not joined; in Hunt the bootmakers' activity had been
directed at a non-union jour, Home. In other labour conspiracy cases,
Hunt was miscited,243 or (as in Donaldson) was cited to support convic-
tions because of the loopholes it contained,244 or was ignored,45 even in
237 See, e.g., Burdick, Conspiracy as a Crime, and as a Tort (1907), 18 Hare. L. Rev. 444.
Smith, Crucial Issues in Labor Litigation (Pts. 1-3) (1907), 20 Harv. L. Rev. 253, 345, 429.
Smith could easily have cited Hunt, for example, in his discussion (id. at 347) of the realization
then dawning among advanced laissez-faire ideologues that labour combinations ought to be al-
lowed to balance "combinations of capital" in order to avoid civil war, a realization which Levy
puts at the core of the praiseworthiness of Shaw's opinion (Levy, supra note 15, at 203-206).
238 Thus, more indictments for labour conspiracy were brought after Hunt than before it.
This count of criminal conspiracy cases between 1842 and 1890 is derived from Witte, supra note
12, at 829; Landis, supra note 15, at 35; Turner, supra note 12, at 68-71. Witte, who performed
exhaustive research on the subject, noted in addition: "The great majority of the conspiracy cases
of the eighties . . . are unreported and can be traced only through the newspapers and through
the reports of state labor departments." The same is likely true of the period 1842-1879.
239 32 N.J.L. (3 Vroom) 151 (1867).
20 Landis, supra note 15, at 34.
241 See id. at 34n.; text accompanying infra notes 258-67.
12 Master Stevedores Ass'n v. Walsh, 2 Daly 1, 9 (C.C.P.C.Cy. N.Y.) (1867). Master
Stevedores receives adulatory treatment in Petro, Unions and the Southern Courts: III - The
Conspiracy and Tort Foundations of the Labor Injunction (1980), 60 N. C. L. Rev. 543 at 547,
551 passim, in which an individualistic and essentially unsupportable distinction between individ-
ual interests and group interests is elevated into something approaching a religious tenet. Petro
manages to completely ignore Hunt, probably thinking it a closet Marxist opinion.
243 People v. Wilzig, 4 N.Y. Crim. 403 at 413 (0. & T.C. Cy. N.Y.) (1886), where Hunt is
cited for the proposition that "formerly a conspiracy of workingmen to raise the rate of wages was
criminally condemned as an act injurious to trade or commerce."
244 See Commonwealth v. Shelton, I1 Va. L. J. 324 (Hust. C.C. Rd. Va.,) (1887), discussed
in text accompanying infra note 260; State v. Stewart, 59 Vt. 273, 9 AtI. 559 (1887), discussed in
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an instance where the conspiracy charge was dismissed.246 In civil con-
spiracy cases arising out of labour disputes in Massachusetts the same
pattern ensued: Hunt was cited to support liability, 247 or was cited to
allow businessmen to avoid liability because of its expansive language
in favour of competition,248 or was ignored.249 Only Justice Holmes'
famous dissent in Vegelahn v. Guntner seemed to give it due regard.250
But as a landmark of the law - directing litigants and the administra-
tors of justice toward a modern, balanced, competitive, liberal view of
labour organization and labour interests - Hunt left a great deal to be
desired.251
B. Shaw's True Colours in Hunt
Courts were able to use Hunt to support employers because it is
only the import, and not the law, of the opinion which embodies a sense
of balance. Full of technical distinctions, vagueness and loopholes,
Hunt's seemingly pro-labour holding was easy to avoid. As Nelles "cu-
riously" 252 put it, "Shaw was careful to leave open various doors
through which, should occasions arise, [the] law could move to break
effective labor organizations. 253
text accompanying infra note 263; Crump v. Commonwealth, 84 Va. 927, 6 S.E. 620 (1888),
discussed in text accompanying infra note 264.
245 See State v. Glidden, 55 Conn. 46, 8 At. 890 (1887); State v. Dyer, 67 Vt. 690, 32 Atl.
814 (1894); State v. Stockford, 77 Conn. 227, 58 At. 769 (1904).
246 See Commonwealth ex rel. Vallette v. Sheriff, 15 Phila. 393 (C.Qu.Sess.Pa.) (1881).
24 See Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1 (1870), discussed in text accompanying infra note
261.
214 See Bowen v. Matheson, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 499 (1867). The same treatment of Hunt
occurred in Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn. 223, 55 N.W. 1119 (1893), which became a
leading case on the subject. For the expansive language in support of competition in Hunt, see text
accompanying supra note 227.
219 See Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555 (1871).
250 167 Mass. 92 at 106-09, 44 N.E. 1077 at 1081-82 (1896).
251 A few others have reached the same conclusion. "Commonwealth v. Hunt contributed
more to the continued though modified use of the labor conspiracy doctrine than to its demise"
(Turner, supra note 12, at 71). The case "did not, as some writers have stated, mark the end of
the application of the conspiracy doctrine to labor combinations. . . . [Rather, it] seems to have
had comparatively little effect upon the development of the law of labor combinations in this
country" (Witte, supra note 12, at 828-29).
211 Landis, supra note 15, at 33 (noting the contradiction between Nelles' realism in the
statement to be quoted in the text accompanying infra note 254 and Nelles' idealism, embodied in
the statement in the text accompanying supra note 229).
251 Nelles, supra note 112, at 1151.
Landis notes:
[Shaw's] demolition of the indictment pursues a highly technical course, and he avoids
carefully any characterization of the true activity of the strikers [sic] as sanctioned by law.
Nowhere in his judgment is there any indication that the earlier common law authorities
are being rejected; instead, even though they be accepted, technical construction of the
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
Shaw left four such "doors" ajar. First, he ruled that the common
law of labour conspiracy was in force in Massachusetts,254 contrary to
the primary argument of defence counsel, including that of Rantoul, in
most of the previous cases. 255 Moreover, under Shaw's version of the
law (echoing Thacher), 258 no overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy
need be shown by the prosecution. Therefore, a combination itself, if an
illegal goal or illegal means were agreed upon, would be sufficient for
conviction.257 This was in fact a startling step backward. Furthermore,
"acts not punishable by indictment," if contemplated as the goal of a
"combination by numbers . . . [,]would be an unlawful conspiracy, ' '25 8
so it was still possible for legal acts within the rights of individuals to
be illegal merely because those individuals combined together. Given
the vagueness with which the contours of illegality and labour conspir-
acy were defined, many activities of labour organizations (and even
plans not acted upon) could still be indictable as conspiracies. Thus, in
Commonwealth v. Hilton a Virginia court instructed the jury that
Hunt stood for the proposition that the common law of labour conspir-
acy was still in force in the United States.2 59 Almost any labour con-
duct except that specifically approved of in Hunt could, because of the
slipperiness inherent in common law rule making, be legitimately
found conspiratorial under Hunt.
Second, these broad and loose common law bounds of illegality, in
addition to the tone of Shaw's opinion, permitted and encouraged
courts to persist in identifying the good of the community with laissez-
faire ideology, or with the interests of entrepreneurs. Labour combina-
tions which, in the opinion of the judge, had "dangerous and perni-
cious" goals, or which might be banded together for what the judge
found to be open or secret "purposes of oppression or injustice", would
still be indictable.2 60 Thus, in the Massachusetts civil case of Carew v.
Rutherford,6 Hunt's "oppression or injustice" rubric was used to hold
illegal an attempt by a union to fine an employer for violating the
union's rules. Any means by labour which, in a court's judgment,
indictment fails to disclose a case within their ambit ...
(Landis, supra note 15, at 33).
254 Hunt (on appeal) at 121.
255 And thus contrary to Nelles' reading of the case (see text accompanying supra note 229).
251 See text accompanying supra note 214.
257 Hunt (on appeal) at 125.
258 Id. at 123.
259 Commonwealth v. Shelton, 11 Va. L.J. 324 (Hust. C.C. Rd. Va., 1887).
280 Hunt (on appeal) at 129.
281 106 Mass. 1 (1870).
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amounted to "coercion, or duress, by force or fraud ... [or] ...
falsehood or force" 26 2 could, under Hunt, be termed unlawful means.
Thus, in State v. Stewart, a strike and a boycott were held to be illegal
coercion,26 3 while a closed shop and a black listing arrangement were
found in Crump v. Commonwealth to be within the "falsehood or
force" rubric.26' The facts in neither case seem to be broadly distin-
guishable from those in Hunt. As Marjorie Turner has aptly put it,
"[the law thus stated in Hunt puts the judiciary fully in charge." 265
Hunt might stand for anything; the apparently fair legal rulings proved
to be nothing but phantasms, subject to the prejudices of judges to an
even greater extent than legal rules usually are. To one historian this
was "obviously intentional". 266 Another has concluded: "[R]ather than
upholding the closed shop or the right to strike, Shaw was really pro-
viding the rationale for their [judicial] control. 26 7
Third, Shaw explicitly excepted from the ambit of protection those
union members who were subjected to contracts by their employers. "If
a large number of men, engaged for a certain time, should combine
together to violate their contract, and quit their employment together
[i]t would surely be a conspiracy to do an unlawful act. . . .It
262 Hunt (on appeal) at 132, 134.
263 State v. Stewart, 59 Vt. 273, 9 At]. 559 (1887).
26 Crump v. Commonwealth, 84 Va. 927, 6 S.E. 620 (1888).
265 Turner, supra note 12, at 66.
266 Landis, supra note 15, at 33.
267 Turner, supra note 12, at 68. Authors have imputed to Shaw a "consciously" duplicitous
purpose - the intention noted by Landis, see text accompanying supra note 267, or the care
remarked upon by Nelles, see text accompanying supra note 229, or the purposiveness to be in-
ferred from Turner's remark quoted in the text accompanying this footnote - must be understood
in a complicated fashion. Shaw intended to write a good common law legal opinion - which
meant carefully giving judges the leeway appropriate for further interpretation and adumbration
of a necessarily loosely-defined common law crime. He would have fought to suppress any of his
own biases he might have noticed expressly intruding themselves, but he would have failed to
understand the way that his entrepreneurial interests and High Federalist upbringing organically
molded his entire thrust of thought and patterns of activity; and he certainly would have failed to
notice that those biases were to a large extent inherent both in the substantive law of labour
conspiracy and in the common law method of adjudication.
The substantive flexibility of Hunt is a reflection of the vagueness of the common law crime
of conspiracy itself, and of the extreme leeway thought to be necessary to the judicial role in
interpretation. As Shaw admitted, it was difficult to frame "any definition or description, to be
drawn from the decided cases, which shall specifically identify this offense [conspiracy] - a
description broad enough to include all cases punishable under this description, without including
acts which are not punishable" [Hunt (on appeal) at 123].
I do not say that Shaw intended to fool the world, but I do say that the structures of liberal
thought and common law judicial decision-making are such that they allow the intelligent ideo-
logue to express an apparent concession in a manner which actually negates that concession and,
in the end, keeps the ideologue's deep economic interests intact, all entirely "unconsciously" (see
text accompanying notes infra 281-96).
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would be a case very different from that stated ... .e Mill labour
was more important economically than artisan shoemaking in Massa-
chusetts in 1842 (at least insofar as concerned Shaw and his circle of
friends), and mill hands were invariably worked under contract. Here
Shaw's judicious neutrality wears very thin. Not only was he appar-
ently "at pains . ..to convey to textile interests that they need not
fear increased danger of labor organization in the mills as a result of
his decision, ' 269 but the language he used ensured that it would be ap-
plied to ever-increasing numbers of workers subject to contracts.
These contracts were presumed by Shaw and by contemporary
theory to have been fairly entered into, even though they were in fact
contracts of adhesion without the possibility of negotiation when made
(as usual) on an individual basis.2 70 In an age of contractarianism, 27 1
when the usual form of labour oppression was rapidly becoming that
fiction of freedom and individualism embodied in the notion of con-
tract, and when contracts were actually becoming much more useful in
an economy increasingly concerned with commodities futures and with
time and distance - an economy which the Boston merchants and in-
dustrialists like Shaw were intimately in contact with and part of -
Shaw had quite naturally sensed the organic needs 272 of his culture. He
thus attempted to provide for them in an appropriate way, even if he
was "unconscious" of having done so, and even if other resolutions
might also have served those interests. The seeming fairness and bal-
ance of Shaw's refiguration of the labour conspiracy doctrine was par-
alleled by the seeming fairness of the notion of labour contracts.
Fourth, Shaw supported balance and fairness only in the abstract.
He rendered it impossible for anyone to be foolish enough to conceive
of the labour conspiracy doctrine being applied to entrepreneurially
competitive situations. He ruled that it would be "highly meritorious
and public spirited" for a combination to "have a tendency to impover-
ish another" if that tendency be caused by competition. 27 3 He further
stated:
It is scarcely necessary to allude to the familiar instances of opposition lines of
268 Hunt (on appeal) at 131.
269 Nelles, supra note 112, at 1162.
270 In this paragraph, the statements on the contractual basis for mill employment are
founded upon Dublin, supra note 56 passim; Ware, The Early New England Cotton Manufacture(1931) at 260-68. See also Sullivan, The Industrial Worker in Pennsylvania, 1800-1840 (1955) at
34-38, 47-49; supra note 69.
271 See Holt, supra note 8, at 671-72.
272 See id. at 707-15.
272 Hunt (on appeal) at 134.
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conveyance, rival hotels, and the thousand other instances, where each strives to
gain custom to himself, by ingenious improvements, by increased industry, and
by all the means by which he may lessen the price of commodities, and thereby
diminish the profits of others.
27 4
No less than historian Leonard Levy and Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes have supposed that this language was an attempt by Shaw to
detoxify class struggle idealistically, by transmuting it into the familiar,
socio-economically bland category of "free competition". Holmes, cit-
ing Shaw's "good sense", mused that "the policy [of free competition]
is not limited to struggles between persons of the same class, competing
for the same end. It applies to all conflicts of temporal interests." 275
Levy agreed: "Shaw founded his decision on the belief that benefits to
the public might accrue from the contest between unions and employ-
ers."'27 6 It is difficult, however, to understand Shaw as approving or pro-
moting producer's co-operatives, 77 although he probably was "subcon-
sciously" gripped by a sense that the fundamental struggle between
competing social interests (as represented by the dispute before him)
ought to be described in terms which did not tend to provoke danger. A
less tendentious reading than that of Holmes and Levy concludes that
Shaw sensed (as the workers' attorneys had argued in the conspiracy
cases) that impoverishment for many was the natural "tendency" for
many in the unceasing fight for a competitive edge, which constituted
the perceived Utopia in his social context. Chief Justice Shaw saw that
the "sauce for the goose" notion inherent in legal fairness might lead
either to the acquittal of workers in a future labour conspiracy case or
to the attempted indictment for conspiracy of one employer by another,
unless the situations were distinguished. Shaw was separating workers
from employers, not joining them together.
Hunt was, of course, a real victory for the Boston bootmakers. The
decision was also a moral victory for labour since it was the first deci-
sion in which the law was not stated in such a way as to favour the
masters. Nevertheless, what seemed to be a major labour triumph was
actually vague, slippery, equivocal, cautious. Its neutrality was only ap-
274 Id. Courts got this part of Shaw's message (see supra note 249 and accompanying text).
275 Vegelahn, supra note 251, at 1081-82.
276 Levy, supra note 15, at 204-05.
277 Producers' co-operatives were a feature of the contemporary scene, being a common reac-
tion by workers to the economic strength of employers. For example, on June 28, 1794, during a
strike, Baltimore's shoemakers "organized a cooperative undertaking, the first in what would be-
come a long line of such collective enterprises" (Steffen, supra note 54, at 116). The tailors of
Baltimore followed suit in 1799 (Id. at 118). The defeated Philadelphia journeymen shoemakers
did the same in 1806 (as already noted) (see supra note 73, and accompanying text). See gener-
ally Mittelman, supra note 78, at 466-69; Foner, supra note 3, at 178-81; Faler, supra note 54, at
182-85, 201.
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parent. It did not provide the basis for a continuing series of union
wins. Given the simple deterministic biases of our time - biases which
seem embedded in both liberal and Marxist thought - scholars have
concluded either that Shaw intended this duplicitous result or that he
should be thought of as having intended nothing at all, being merely a
conduit for the operation of social and economic forces.2 78 Nelles and
Leonard Levy, for example, have indicated several contemporary politi-
cal and economic pressures which they thought tended to impel the
Massachusetts court to rule for the workers. 7 9 Other scholars have be-
come livid at the suggestion that such an excellent judge might have
rendered a judgment due to purely external considerations. Roscoe
Pound found Hunt to be a natural development in the law of conspir-
acy, its author having been a conscientious and upright jurist "acting in
the light of the received [legal] ideals of the times. '280
Pound's idealism must be rejected because it abstracts the law
from its context and gives it an autonomous and ethereal reality all its
own, contrary to experience; it would deny the law's connection to any
socio-economic factors. Socio-economic pressures were (and are) not
"purely external" to the law; however, the method by which Shaw and
his colleagues became legally aware of these factors was by no means
as simple or as direct as is implied by the economic determinism of
Nelles and Levy in the "mirror" metaphor, or the "conscious-subcon-
scious" dichotomy. Context, culture and connections must be taken into
account in a more complex and sophisticated theory of determinism
which recognizes that limits of consciousness and intentionality are pro-
vided by an intuitive understanding of what is "normal". This in turn
derives from the process of acculturation which has (with complications
due to each individual's unique experience) produced the human sub-
ject under scrutiny. The acculturation process is itself biased and par-
278 See Comment, supra note 223.
279 Nelles argued that the contemporary political situation in Massachusetts was important:
since the competing parties were apparently of equal strength, the votes of the workers might have
made a difference, and Shaw would have desired to attract those votes to his conservative side (see
Nelles, supra note 112, at 1153-62). Levy "pooh-poohed" Nelles' "crude theory of judicial deci-
sion in which considerations of law are completely ignored" (Levy, supra note 15, at 196). Levy
also rejected Pound's idealistic legalism (see text accompanying infra note 281), which was based
solely on "the taught legal tradition" (Levy, id. at 202) and thus omitted all socio-economic con-
text. Levy adopted two theories of Hunt which seem to me to be just as crudely determinist as
that of Nelles. First, he thought that Shaw was attempting to rebut those anxious to codify the
law by showing that "the common law was liberalism itself" in its concern for workers (Id. at
199); second, Levy alleged that "Shaw regarded combinations, whether by entrepreneurs or work-
ers, as inherent in a free competitive society, and he saw a social gain in the competition between
interests" (id. at 203). On codification, see Gordon, Book Review (1983), 36 Vand. L. Rev. 431.
280 Pound, The Formative Era of American Law (1938) at 87.
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tial; it is a product and thus reflective of the interests, by and large, of
those who are in the process of producing the culture. A norm
derives from the pressure that concrete economic forces exert both on the exter-
nal organization of the social structure (producing a "normal" arrangement of
interlocking economic functions) and on the internal organization of the social
structure (producing a "normal" intersubjective life-world of abstract social
roles). 28 1
The Hunt opinion was written within a general context of aware-
ness of "labour unrest" and within the specific context of the conditions
of the labour market in urban New England. Shaw, a banker and in-
vestor, was aware of business' needs and desires. 82 As a result, some
socio-economic pressures probably directly impinged upon the decision.
Nelles' claim that Shaw's exception for labourers under contract was a
message to New England mill owners is likely accurate;2 83 and Landis
was similarly correct in concluding that Shaw was aware of the manner
in which the decision would legitimate trade unionism.'" The publica-
tion of the opinion in Hunt was apparently delayed for a long time,
only to be issued soon after the anti-labour Farwell opinion.28 5 More-
over, as Nelles noted, Shaw dealt with the notoriously slippery common
law of conspiracy "with an old-style technical rigour which was not
always characteristic of him." 288
281 Gabel, supra note 114, at 10.
This sense of the normal movement of the total "factual" context, without which it would
be impossible to apply the law to any discrete situation, has been interiorized by the judge
during the course of his conditioning. It is a dialectical common-knowledge or common-
sense that each of us possesses by virtue of having been raised within the same culture, as
that culture is mediated through concretely experienced social collectives, such as the fam-
ily, the school, and the workplace, and through social collectives that are experienced more
abstractly, such as one's social class and the media. And this common-knowledge or com-
mon-sense is itself alienated to the extent that these collectives which communicate the
"real" through terror and coercion are themselves alienated reciprocities, reciprocities pas-
sivized within the roles that bear a functional relationship to the system's total functioning
.... [T]he judge interiorizes his class which is itself defined and constituted as the collec-
tive interior negation of the class against which it struggles, within an intersubjective total-
ity that is given its organization by certain determinate economic pressures. Thus, it is
accurate to say that the judge knows himself and is "self-conscious" by virtue of this
knowledge of the whole. He has what one might call an historical sense of the normal that
must be a commonsense among all those to whom the same law applies.
(Gabel, supra note 8, at 267). See generally Gabel, The Social Psychology of Law and Legal
Process (unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, 1981). See also, e.g., Tushnet, The American Law of Slavery
1810-1860. Considerations of Humanity and Interest (1981) at 31-32.
282 Supra note 222 and accompanying text.
283 See text accompanying supra note 270.
284 See text accompanying supra note 233.
25 See text accompanying supra notes 223, 225. For an explanation of the Farwell decision,
see supra note 223.
288 Nelles, supra note 112, at 1149.
The infrequent use of citation - often its total absence - was habitual with Shaw. Al-
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Nevertheless, it is unlikely that Shaw considered himself to have
been overtly responding to socio-economic pressures external to the
law,217 even in an age of instrumental adjulication and even though he
was an instrumental judge.288 Pound correctly reminds "Marxian eco-
nomic determinists" to understand that Shaw was "trained in the com-
mon law tradition" and was an "honest man" who stubbornly refused
to be swayed by the democratic prejudices of others.289 The Massachu-
setts court in Hunt,290 and indeed all the men who sat as judges in the
labour conspiracy cases of the previous three decades, had been accul-
turated within approximately identical proto-bourgeois and legal con-
texts. In the first half of the nineteenth-century, labour cases probably
presented class conflict 291 and social distension to American courts
though he was duly respectful of the value of old formulas, he was more often compelled to
make them serviceable ... [H]e often explained principles in terms of public policy or
social advantage, and placed his decisions on the broadest possible ground.
(Levy, supra note 15, at 24).
2 See generally Horwitz, supra note 118.
Compare Holt, supra note 8, at 711.
289 Pound, supra note 280, at 87-88.
290
Shaw's associates, who concurred in the "liberal" decision in Commonwealth v. Hunt
[unitalicized in original] were Samuel S. Wilde, an old line Federalist, who had been a
member of the Hartford Convention, Charles Dewey, who had been brought up in the
office of that obstinate Federalist and aristocrat Theodore Sedgwick, and Samual Hubbard,
an appointee of the Federalist-Whigs.
(Id. at 88.)
291 "Class" and "class conflict" are, for most purposes relevant to this essay, interchangeable
terms and concepts. For many non-Marxists the terms often used by Marxists seem to be vague
and imprecise, now meaning one thing and now seemingly used to refer to something different
with even an opposite meaning. "The most formidable hurdle facing all readers of Marx is his
.peculiar' use of words," Bertell Ollman states in the opening of his book which attempts, in over
300 pages, to explain Marx's idiosyncratic usages. "Vilfredo Pareto provides us with the classic
statement of this problem when he asserts that Marx's words are like bats: one can see in them
both birds and mice" [Ollman, Alienation (2d ed. 1976) at 3]. I recommend a close and serious
reading of Oilman's book before deciding that Marxists mean nothing, or everything, or something
essentially irrelevant or incomprehensible when their key concepts are used in discussion.
Marx's useful theories and views depend upon a dialectical theory of perception; Marxist
concepts are "like bats" because the fundamental units of experience are Relations. Elements of
reality are defined not in isolation, not by separating them from everything else, but by their
connections and relationships. The irreducible unit of perceptive experience is a Relation, a core of
meaning understood in large part by, from, and within its historic, social, multi-dimensional con-
text. In this view, individuals cannot meaningfully be divorced from their social and temporal
environs. People are defined by their relationships.
The most fundamental of human relationships, as Marxists read history, are connections
amongst humans and the means of production - connections which enable the continuance of life
and the satisfaction of the most fundamental of human needs and desires. Since those means are
apparently scarce and are actually inequitably distributed, the interests of people in having access
to them are opposed one to another. "Class" is a complex clash of interests, not simply of people
or groups. "Class conflict" can at times meaningfully be seen as revolving around the interests of a
relatively large group of "have-nots" opposing those of a small elite (sometimes quite openly, but
usually partially subtly and insidiously), all concerning access to the means of production largely
controlled by the latter. Just as often, this opposition is submerged, apparently hidden within the
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more directly and bluntly than did other legal disputes. Indeed, the
labour conspiracy judges constantly referred to the problem. Conse-
quently, the social fabric of legalistic behaviour, belief and thought (de-
veloped in part to neutralize such stresses by .normalizing, sublimating
or ignoring them) would naturally show signs of strain when confronted
with such cases. For Shaw, however, the fabric only stretched and
buckled; it did not break. If anything, Shaw probably saw himself in
Hunt as ironing out dangerous and unseemly wrinkles in the fabric of
the law, restoring its legitimacy.
Shaw and his colleagues genuinely believed in the developmental
laissez-faire notions with which they "generously larded their opinions
in labor-conspiracy cases, '"292 and that the needs and future of their
community were bound up in "growth", entrepreneurship and the in-
terests of employers. That was entirely "normal" for them. Rantoul, in
polite rhetoric, told Shaw about the class bias of judges and the bias
inherent in the law of labour conspiracy itself. But Shaw's education,
training and social environment prevented him from being able to real-
ize fully the truth in what Rantoul was saying. What Shaw likely un-
derstood was that the law of conspiracy appeared to have been often
unfairly propounded, not that it was unfair. The Massachusetts judges
probably did not understand themselves to be acting in a partial, un-
critical and one-sided fashion as class oppressors. They did not perceive
how one-sidedness was built not only into their attitudes, but also into
the substantive law of conspiracy and the common law judicial process
itself. They could not have reached such a conclusion without rejecting
their heritage, their context, their culture, their grasp on reality; in
short, their class position and class interests.
We must not, however, misperceive the function of the system of
welter and variety of human life. Marx thought that the conditions of modern life would bring
class conflict into the open, solidifying various classes into roughly two "groups", and rending the
two clashing "groups" more conscious of themselves, of each other, and of the equities involved in
their constant opposition.
Class "membership" is defined not by characteristics of wealth, age, sex, nationality, race,
occupation, lifestyle, ideology, or social or legal or political status or power (although each or all
of these may be important), but by the factors of relationship between persons (or, more correctly,
between the interests of persons in groups) and their access to the means of maintaining social
life. Moreover, the opposition captured in the Marxist notion of class does not display itself promi-
nently in every objective feature of existence; persons whose class interests are opposed may share
other interests and may even live and work together in relative harmony (see Tucker, supra note
223). Class is not necessarily subjective in the sense which is normally understood. At least three
of the works cited, supra note 54 (those by Nash, Faler and Dawley) are, in the view taken by
their authors, expositions of.the social phenomenon of class in a sophisticated and complex historic
social setting. Such is likely the best way of "defining" class: from the experience of history itself
[see also Ollman, "Marx's Use of 'Class'" in Ollman, Social and Sexual Revolution (1979) at
33].
"' Levy, supra note 15, at 185.
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common law adjudication by focusing too narrowly upon rules or re-
sults. The most important function of ideology (and of ideology-produc-
ers, such as judges) in a hierarchical social system (where direct force
often cannot be utilized) is the "manipulation of symbols, images, and
ideas . . . to legitimize a social order that most people find alienating
and inhumane." 293 By its open bias, the prior trend in the labour con-
spiracy decisions seemed to become a threat to the legitimacy of the
system itself.
Judicial opinions play an important part in this process of legitimation because
the rules which they enunciate assert that existing social norms are the conse-
quence of rights and obligations established through legitimate or just political
processes. And one means of reinforcing this appearance of legitimacy is through
applying these rules in a more-or-less even-handed way. Since the rules express(and help to constitute) existing hierarchical norms, it is the relatively neutral
application of these rules that best serves to reinforce the apparent legitimacy of
the existing social order in people's minds.2 "
Shaw was restoring the common law to an appearance of fairness, and
in this he was supremely successful, as is demonstrated by the continu-
ing high praise for Hunt. Moreover, the decision "fits". The con-
tractarian core295 of the emerging laissez-faire culture demanded the
appearance of an approximation of equality between bargainers. The
"received ideals" of Pound's beloved common law system naturally
brought the able and intelligent Shaw to a doctrinally sound, culturally
resonant, apparently legitimate and utterly "normal" resolution.
Shaw thus made the law of labour conspiracy seem more fair, by
cabining it into rules with associated exceptions. This painstakingly-
formulated but murky legalism retained the possibility of misuse and
one-sided application, but that was the "expected" result of the vague-
ness inherent in common law adjudication. Moreover, the rules looked
even-handed, and its misuse would occur, if it ever did, through appli-
cation of the usual common law process of interpretation (or through
the application of the notion of contract, that quintessentially capitalist
doctrine, which encapsulates the contradiction of the seeming fairness
and the actual unfairness of capitalist life). Workers' lawyers had for
years argued that the common law was class biased, and although
Shaw's decision was not particularly addressed to the workers, they had
nevertheless received a windfall from it. The case was addressed to
2 Gabel & Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and the
Practice of Law (1983), 11 Rev. Law & Soc. Change 369 at 370.
24 Id. at 369-70; see also text accompanying supra note 3.
215 See text accompanying supra note 272.
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those who read legal opinions: lawyers, judges and other rising, mid-
dling or eminent people who needed to be reassured about the legiti-
macy of the system. As Leonard Levy has put it, using terms contain-
ing the same apparent class-neutrality as does most mainstream
ideology, Shaw "reconciled the standing law with the needs of a free
society." 296
V. CONCLUSION
A. Going Too Far
Too much can be made of the history of labour law examined in
this essay. First, it must be emphasized that only elite aspects of the
problems presented by the early labour conspiracy cases were given a
solution by Chief Justice Shaw. While evidence does not readily pre-
sent itself, it is unlikely that the workers were convinced by Hunt of the
essential fairness and evenhandedness of American law or of American
judges. Those who were willing to suspend their disbelief after Hunt
were likely driven back to their previous view by the re-emergence of
conspiracy law as a means of labour control in the 1860s, and by its
growth into the law of injunctions and equitable receivership which,
after the 1880s, proved an even more effective method of labour
suppression. 297
Second, it must also be emphasized that the solution which Shaw
propounded to the elite was not immediately accepted into the prevail-
ing ideology.29 8 Prosecutors, judges and legal commentators in the re-
maining decades of the nineteenth century did not seize upon Hunt as
presenting a solution which properly balanced the interests of labour
and management against the legitimacy needs of the rule of law.
Workers' needs and protests were handled after Hunt, in general, by
identifying the needs of the whole community with the needs of bur-
geoning capital to the same extent as had, for example, Recorder Levy
or Chief Justice Savage. Laissez-faire arguments were still essentially
unquestioned by judges until the rise of Progressivism late in the nine-
teenth-century. Even then the Legal Realist movement of the 1920s
and 1930s was only a step in the right direction. There never was, in
298 Levy, supra note 15, at 188 (also quoted in text accompanying supra note 220).
297 Frankfurter & Greene, The Labor Injunction (1930); Eggert, A Missed Alternative: Fed-
eral Courts as Arbiters of Railway Labor Disputes (1966), 7 Labor Hist. 287; United States v.
Debs, 64 Fed. 724 (7th Cir. 1894).
298 As one commentator put it, Shaw's opinion "foreshadows clearly the doctrine of a later
day that the legality of a strike is to be made to depend upon the end sought to be obtained"
(Landis, supra note 15, at 33)
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the United States, that critical wing of the establishment represented in
Europe by socialist professors and workers' political parties. (When one
seemed to be developing in the first decades of the twentieth-century, it
was bludgeoned by the Great Red Scare of 1919-1920.)299 It has only
been in the twentieth century that Hunt has come to be acclaimed.
Third, the solution propounded by Shaw was by no means a just
one. It took the real needs and interests of labourers into account to
approximately the same extent as did the "doctrine" it attempted to
replace. The divisions between elite and workers were real, deep,
widening, but essentially and substantively ignored by elites, especially
in the nineteenth-century. Proposals for radical renovation came from
representatives of the working classes,30 0 but many were problematic
and all were ignored. Shaw's solution merely made it appear that the
law was fair; it did almost nothing toward actually rendering the law
fair.
Fourth, my conclusions have been approached by previous scholars
such as Nelles, Landis, Leonard Levy and Turner. I have attempted by
profuse and sometimes extensive quotation not only to demonstrate that
Marxist scholarship treats the same phenomena in much the same ways
as does non-Marxist scholarship, but also to exhibit the great debt
which I owe to those who came before me. The essential difference
between us is their unwillingness to assume the existence of class con-
ffict, their inability to see (in the socio-economic context of the law
which some do try to take into account) the evidence of oppressive,
malignant and disjunctive gaps between the point of view of the em-
ployers and that of the workers. They are unwilling to admit that, like
early nineteenth-century judges, they retain a modified form of the em-
ployers' viewpoint.3 0 1 My own experience and my reading of history
urge me to start from the assumption that class differences exist. While
2" Murray, Red Scare (1955); Levin, Political Hysteria in America (1971); Leuchtenberg,
The Perils of Prosperity 1914-1932, (1958) at 35-49, 66-83; Irons, "Fighting Fair": Zacharlah
Chafee Jr., The Department of Justice, and the "Trial at the Harvard Club," (1981) 94 Harv. L.
Rev. 1205. See also Caute, The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge Under Truman and
Eisenhower (1978); Griffith & Theoharis, eds., The Specter: Original Essays on the Cold War
and the Origins of McCarthyism (1974); Navasky, Naming Names (1980).
800 See, e.g., Skidmore, The Rights of Man to Propertyl (1829); Foner, supra note 3, at 167-
218.
s'0 Acceptance of the fact of class conflict is only one of the characteristics of Marxist
thought which differentiate it from liberal thought. Other characteristics include, for example,
rejection of a radical "in-here" versus "out-there" dichotomy and acceptance of a dialectical,
holistic, integrative world-view (see, supra note 292 and works cited therein; Holt, supra note 8, at
669n., 801n.) This is neither to say that Marxist thought has always agreed upon these matters,
nor to deny that even the best strands of existing Marxist thought need enrichment [see Holt,
supra note 15, esp. at 286n., 287n.; Holt, A Law Book for All Seasons: Toward a Socialist
Jurisprudence (1983), 14 Rutgers L. J. 915 at 943-49].
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an acceptance of class analysis ultimately does impel one to take either
the employers' position or the workers', it also assumes the ability to
recognize the existence and the arguments of the other side, the inextri-
cable interrelationships between the two sides, that the other side
thinks its arguments are unimpeachably valid and that the positions of
each side are based ultimately upon its own socio-economic needs and
interests. Class unites as well as separates, as the dialectical point of
view demonstrates.
Fifth, the early labour conspiracy cases present an extreme rather
than a typical example of class bias in the law. While I believe that law
tends to embody class needs and interests rather than universal social
needs and interests, and that labour law demonstrates elite bias more
openly than does other law, most case law derives from situations in
which fundamental social conflict is either less direct or apparently not
present at all. In such situations, the shifting factions and alliances
among various elite segments and sometimes between and among elites
and non-elite segments, it becomes more difficult and perhaps less use-
ful to engage in a full-blown class analysis of the law. In today's soci-
ety, class ordinarily may be a matter of the fragmentation of personal-
ity within individuals,30 2 simply another way of viewing the skew,
oppression and bias of the complex socio-economic interpenetrations
comprising today's social formation. The more fragmented we are, the
more interconnected portions of us become. However, I do not mean to
urge that the sort of class analysis which can be done of this mass of
data can be easily transferred to operate upon all cases or all law.
B. The Strengths of Class Analysis
Too little can also be made of the conclusions reached in this es-
say, especially in light of the above. First, it is crucial to understand
the nature, indeed the very existence, of the point of view advanced by
the workers. They were the underdogs and the losers, those trampled
upon in the name of democracy and prosperity for all; but they pro-
tested perceptively, vigorously and mightily, to no apparent immediate
avail. Only by actually understanding matters from the point of view of
the jour, and of the jour's comrades-in-arms, can we sustain hope for
genuine progress.
Further, it is important to recognize that the law rarely recognizes
302 See, e.g., Gordon et al., supra note 54; Wright, Class, Crisis and the State (1978);
Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century
(1974); Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations
(1978).
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the point of view of the worker. Class bias does exist in the law. At
times, the bias has been open and blatant; however, the source of that
bias, at least in some instances, was the direct and troublesome clash
between employers and employees at a time when the socio-economic
system was undergoing novel, stressful, excruciating change.30 3 More-
over, class bias exists even in neutral legal rules. It is quite important
to understand the 'class-biased nature of apparently benign, universal
notions of "growth" and modernization, and of the liberal democracies
and legal systems supposedly linked to them.
The judges who disregarded the arguments and the increasingly
desperate plight of workers in these conspiracy cases were reared in
and retained an important place in a culture which, however insular
and partial it may have been within American society in 1800, found
the values of entrepreneurial, individualistic, competitive capitalism to
be good, obvious and true. The arguments made by the employers reso-
nated with that world view. Some arguments made by the workers
might seem to have fit within that world view too, at least if one ac-
cepted the surface logic and apparent fairness of contractualism. How-
ever, the underlying power relationships in the central concept of pri-
vate property, which in effect placed control of the means of production
in the hands of the entrepreneurs while concomitantly disregarding the
collective nature of their exercise of power, proved to be the real truth,
as the result of the indictment of the employers for conspiracy in Com-
monwealth v. Carlisle demonstrates. Justice Gibson's words bear
repetition:
The combination of capital for purposes of commerce, or to carry on any other
branch of industry, although it may in its consequences indirectly operate on
third persons, is unaffected by this consideration [the illegality inherent in labour
combination], because it is a common means in the ordinary course of human
affairs, which stimulates competition and enables men to engage in undertakings
too weighty for an individual.304
The epigraphs to this essay tell the same tale.
One normal liberal-capitalist mode of deflection of the argument
that the judges and the law were biased is to argue that judges could
not have been biased, since there was little or no "conscious" discrimi-
nation against the workers. As noted above,305 the requirement of "con-
sciousness" focuses too sharply on the individual judges and ignores the
cultural envelope within which they spoke, acted and understood them-
303 See also Holt, supra note 15, at 281-82.
:04 Carlisle at 41; also quoted in text accompanying supra note 159.
05 See supra notes 268 and 281-96 and accompanying text.
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selves. It postulates a "self' which is somehow isolated from its sur-
roundings, a self whose awareness conveniently dictates the boundaries
of its being, a self suited to life in the marketplace. It is, in short, a
rationale utterly within the cultural discourse of capitalism, having the
same source as the judges' argument that competition is good and nor-
mal. Thus, it is subject to the same attack of partiality.
A second normal liberal-capitalist deflection is to turn to legalistic
abstractions. One postulates a "law" of criminal conspiracy or a "law"
of labour conspiracy; the focus is on doctrine, rules, exceptions and
logic rather than on the quality of the context or on the social referents
of the elements of argument. Legal education, for example, proclaims
the truth of such an approach to law, institutionalizing the neutrality of
these sanitized verbal meshes and reinforcing the cultural smoke-screen
which has erased the politics as the source of legal discourse.30 By
accepting the neutral rhetoric of the judges at face value, one forgoes
the chance of getting behind its built-in blinders. It is not difficult to
demonstrate, however, that the entire cluster of rules is nothing more
than a highly articulated collection of contradictions.30 7
The collapse of the liberal-capitalistic universe of normality308 has
generated a number of alternative theories and constructs, 3 9 though
only one will be taken into account here. It is the one recently devel-
oped by the irrationalists within the Critical Legal Studies movement,
comrades in our "party of humanity," 310 who have convinced them-
selves that the indeterminacy of liberal legalism is a characteristic that
fatally infects all attempts to construct a social theory.311 In this view,
"' See, e.g., Horwitz, The Conservative Tradition in the Writing of American Legal History
(1973), 17 Am. J. Leg. Hist. 275; Kennedy, "Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy" in
Kairys, ed., supra note 16, at 40.
"1 This has been the task of those in the Critical Legal Studies movement (see, e.g., Holt,
supra note 302, at 917-26; Freeman, Truth and Mystification in Legal Scholarship (1981), 90
Yale L. J. 1229). The best statement of the position is Tushnet, An Essay on Rights (1984), 62
Tex. L. Rev. 1363 at 1363-94.
308 See, e.g., Habermas, "Modernity - An Incomplete Project", in Foster, ed., The Anti-
Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture (1983) at 3; Unger, Knowledge and Politics (1975);
Whitebrook, Saving the Subject: Modernity and the Problem of the Autonomous Individual
(1981-82), 50 Telos 79. See generally McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jargen Habermas
(1978); Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (1982).
"0 The most important of these are feminism, see, e.g., MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism,
Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence (1983), 8 Signs: J. Women Culture &
Soc'y 635; MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory
(1982), 7 Signs: J. Wommen Culture & Soc'y 515; and deconstruction, see, e.g., Derrida, Writing
and Difference, [Bass trans.] (1978); Ryan, Marxism and Deconstruction: A Critical Articulation
(1982). See generally Dallmayr, Twilight of Subjectivity: Contributions to a Post-Individualistic
Theory of Politics (1981).
310 Tushnet, supra note 307, at 1364 passim.
M1 See, e.g., Gordon, "New Developments in Legal Theory", in Kairys, ed., supra note 16, at
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capitalism exists, producing alienation, but the legal ideology of those
living within the culture of capitalism cannot usefully be described as
exhibiting class bias because all ideology is too indeterminate. "Law is
merely an instance of social mythologizing," the irrationalist-indeter-
minists assert;312 the class bias argument fails because it is all in our
minds and there is no way that domination can break into our minds
unless we let it do so. "What we experience as 'social reality' is some-
thing that we ourselves are constantly constructing," they argue.313
"There is no 'true' analysis that comports with the way things really
are, because there is no hard social reality separate from our social
construction of meaning."314
The irrationalist-indeterminast argument ends at a position sur-
prisingly like that of the liberal deflectionists just criticized. The diffi-
cult apparent problem of the relationship between "out there" and "in
here" is solved idealistically, by refusing to emerge from "in here"; the
most important thing in the world is a series of mental constructs,
which both browbeat humanity and free it. Browbeating occurs when
we accept the picture of reality that capitalists create and force upon
us; or when we attempt to co-operate with the powerful in legal ways
which seem to give us more living space but which, by giving us that
apparent space, causes us to sink back, refreshed but snookered.31, We
are freed (on this view) when we decide to see ourselves "as in the
process of continuous creation" in our own minds, when we concomi-
tantly focus upon' "the smallest, most routine, most ordinary interac-
tions of daily life in which some human beings dominate others and
they acquiesce in such domination."31 6 An internal notion of mental
constructs, a series of isolated monads full only of their own all-impor-
tant consciousnesses; it seems just like the liberal world view that both
the irrationalist-indeterminasts and we fellow-travellers have grown to
understand and thus to despise.
But where did the capitalists, those mysterious "elites who have
thought they had some stake in rationalizing their dominant power po-
sitions, 317 come from in the first place? The position of the irrational-
281.
3" Kennedy, Oh My God, It's Alive! Debates About Theory Within Critical Legal Studies
(Jan. 5, 1984), Lizard 3 at 4.
313 Cordon, supra note 312, at 287.
314 Kennedy, supra note 313, at 4.
815 See also Chase, The Left on Rights: An Introduction (1984), 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1541;
Chase, A Challenge to Workers' Rights (1984), 8 Nova L. J. 671.
S6 Gordon, supra note 312, at 290.
317 Id. at 288.
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ist-indeterminast is static, ahistorical, (as Anthony Chase shows) cut-
off from life, from social history itself.318
This essay has attempted to demonstrate the reality of "class bias"
in law by embedding that law within the social history of protesting
workers, as recently described by a rising, hopeful generation of labour
historians.3 19 The mysterious "black box" of causation3 20 (just what
constitutes the connection between entrepreneurial capitalism and the
neuron paths of the monadic judges who sat in these conspiracy cases
anyway?) seems much less problematic. In reality, judges sided with
employers and adopted and espoused the capitalistic world view which'
enveloped those employers securely, and left the workers in the mire
and dust of "progress in industry". The judges fulfilled "the needs of a
free society". 321 The early labour conspiracy cases in the United States
demonstrate a one-sidedness that is the very definition of class bias,
written in the language of normalcy, part and parcel of that bias. 22
APPENDIX
Despite Turner's claim to the contrary, 23 there is some confusion
about which cases should be included in a study like this one. I have
decided to confine myself to the seventeen prosecutions for conspiracy
recorded in Commons, 3 and 4 Documentary History32" and one of the
two civil cases also included therein. These are the eighteen cases listed
and partially analyzed in Table I, below.
Some explanation of the selection criteria ought to be made. I
31S Chase, Workers' Rights, supra note 316, at 680-85. Another radical scholar who agrees
that the alleged radical dichotomy between passions and reason is a recent political invention is
Allan Hutchinson: "[T]he crucial historical relation of power and knowledge" cannot be decon-
structed, he implies; "[t]hey are mutually generative and inseparable. . . . A complex web of
forces that continually disaggregate and coalesce, it is a pervasive and dynamic feature of all
relations" (see Hutchinson, From Cultural Construction to Historical Deconstruction (1984), 94
Yale L. J. 209 at 231). Of course, to view creation in terms of Relations is precisely the "method"
of Marx's dialectic. Although radically to separate "method" from substance, as this formulation
implies, is itself undialectic and anti-Relational (see supra note 292). At least Hutchinson seems
to agree most of the time; at another point, he postulates: "Determinacy is contrived, superficial,
and ephemeral. . ." (Hutchinson, supra, at 235). This returns us to the Klein bottle of nihilism or
ethical relativism.
Yet another radical scholar, who has understood all of this for years, and who insists that the
ancient philosophers did too, and did so better than any of their successors, is L. H. LaRue. See,
e.g., LaRue, Politics and the Constitution (1977), 86 Yale L. J. 1011.
3'9 See works cited, supra note 54.
32o Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An Interpretation of Public Law Schol-
arship in the Seventies (1979), 57 Tex. L. Rev. 1307.
3" Levy, supra note 15, at 188, also quoted in text accompanying supra note 220.
3 See generally Tushnet, supra note 321; Tushnet, supra note 308, at 1394-98.
13 Turner, supra note 12, at 1.
324 Documentary History, supra note 2.
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have attempted to include only those cases about which more is known
than the fact of their existence. Therefore I have excluded the 1836
Philadelphia Coal Heavers prosecution and the 1842 Rockdale Textile
Workers prosecution. 25 (I have, however, included the 1814 Pittsburgh
prosecution of the cordwainers, although little is known about it, since
it was clearly the prelude for the 1815 prosecution of which there is a
full report.) I have also excluded Taylor v. Thompsonville Carpet Mfg.
Co. 26 even though it has been included in the Commons collection,
since it was a civil (tort) action for false arrest, not a conspiracy case
(though it clearly represented the workers' retaliation for the owners'
prior action in tort for conspiracy), and because the outcome is unclear.
Finally, two scholars have included Boston Glass Manufactory v. Bin-
ney327 in their compilations of early conspiracy cases,3 28 but that was a
labour contract case and is not considered here since it did not concern
conspiracy.
I was unable to choose a uniform method of citation. I usually cite
by an appellation indicating the city or town where the case arose and
the type of union which was prosecuted for conspiracy (indicated in the
second column of Table I). However, two of the cases (Carlisle and
Hunt) are sufficiently well known by their proper citation. Commons
reprinted New York Cordwainers in his collection because the pam-
phlet published by Sampson was so much more thorough than the re-
ports of the case in the law books. However, other conspiracy decisions
found in reporters (the two in Hunt, and those in Carlisle, New York
Hatters and Geneva Shoemakers) were not reprinted in Commons' col-
lection and I therefore used the reporters for citations to these cases,
with resulting inconsistencies amongst my citations to the primary
sources for this essay. I hope that Table I will help to dispel any result-
ing confusion.
While many of these conspiracy cases remained totally obscure
until Commons and his associates resuscitated them, others were suffi-
ciently well known to counsel to be cited in subsequent instances. Phil-
adelphia Cordwainers, the first prosecution, was cited by either counsel
or court, or both, in five subsequent cases, including two in New York,
New York Cordwainers was cited in six subsequent cases including
three in Pennsylvania and Hunt. Hunt also cited Geneva Shoemakers,
325 For the 1836 Philadelphia Coal Heavers case, see Mittelman, supra note 78 at 337. For
the 1842 Rockdale Textile Workers case, see Wallace, supra note 2, at 364-65, 373-74.
326 4 Supp. Documentary History, supra note 2, at 126.
327 4 Pick. (Mass.) 425 (1827).
328 Turner, supra note 12, at 2-3; Nelles, supra note 112, at 1167.
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which had in turn contained references to New York Hatters and Phil-
adelphia Cordwainers. The important precedents among the early con-
spiracy cases were, it may be concluded, available to and known by
lawyers and courts, whether or not (as Tony Freyer suggests) stare de-
cisis was not honoured in those times in the same fashion or to the
same extent as it appears to be now. 29
329 See Freyer, Harmony & Dissonance: The Swift and Erie Cases in American Federalism
(1981) at 24-26.
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TABLE II
Citation Records of the Conspiracy Cases
Case (from Table I) Mentioned in (from Table I)
1 3, 5, 6, 9, 13
3 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 17
5 9
6 9
7 8, 13
13 14, 16, 17
14 16
Source: Commons et al., Documentary History, volumes 3 and 4; reported
cases (as mentioned in Table I).

